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Editors' Note

The Jadavpur Journal of International Relations has entered the third year of its publication. Treading the oft changing path of analysis in international relations and its concepts, the Journal tries to provide an insight into its myths and realities. While the general aim is to highlight the broad perspectives of international relations, the specific objective would be to highlight those issues which particularly affect the Indian sub-continent and its immediate surroundings.

The current issue comes up with presentations that lead to a better understanding of some of the real issues of our times. The volume begins with a very current analysis of India's foreign policy implications, then proceeds to examine the profiles of conflict and peace and after a search for alternatives in international relations theory-building, goes on to country studies. A new section for notes and comments has been included in this number.

THE EDITORS

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“Have You Killed Your Tutsi Today ... The
Graves Are Half Empty” ?** :
*AN ANALYSIS OF RWANDA'S HORRENDOUS
HOLOCAUST 1990-1994*

*Murindwa Rutanga**

INTRODUCTION

Rwanda, one of the most populated countries and among the four poorest countries in the world, has undergone a systematic horrendous tragedy since 1990. This small country of 26, 338 sq. km, borders the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, Uganda in the north, Tanzania in the east and Burundi in the south. It is composed of one people — Banyarwanda. These are internally divided into Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. These people have a common history, language, culture, totems and political life. By 1992, Rwanda's population had grown to 7.6 million people, 83% of whom were below the poverty line and 67 % of whom could not get access to social and health services. Over 1.5 million school-going age children could not go to school, which only projected a pathetic figure of malnutrition and starvation.¹

Rwanda, a long feudal monarchical state, founded and controlled by the Batutsi - with King Kigeli tracing it from 1081² — lost its independence to Germany in 1894. Germany also lost Rwanda to Belgium in 1919 after Germany's defeat in the first world war. Of significance is that colonialism retained the ruling Batutsi to man the state. The developments in late 1950s led to the dislodgement of the Batutsi from power and the destruction of their hegemony by the Bahutu. Independence was received by the Bahutu

*** This was the main radio broadcast by the extremist Rwandese Interim Government, urging Bahutu to wipe out Batutsi.*

This paper has benefited greatly from the invaluable inputs of Simon Rutabajuka, CBR; James Akampumuza, Faculty of Commerce, Makerere University and the initial editorial services of Mukotanyi Rugendo, CBR.

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after their eliminating the Batutsi from the Political scene. The subsequent independent governments initially practised the direct exclusion of Batutsi from all resources, including political power. This was gradually followed by forms of discrimination against fellow Bahutu. This was worsened by the rampant corruption, graft, abusive language, detentions, dictatorship and other forms of abuses of office, all of which were anchored in regionalism. These led to mounting suspicions, tensions and murders. A sum-total of these transformed Rwanda into a volatile social bomb, with very high potentialities of social explosion.

The occasion was seized by the Bahutu extremists when the Rwandese refugees mainly of the Batutsi ethnic group invaded Rwanda from Uganda under the RPF movement on October 1, 1990. The ruling extremists manipulated the situation and history for their communalistic political aims. The demagogic, discriminative MRND military dictatorship degenerated into a vicious power struggle that transformed Rwanda into a repellent, pathetic human abattoir. This gradually developed into a horrendous genocide against the Batutsi, following the regicide of two Bahutu Presidents - Habyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi. In terror, tens of thousands of cadavers dived into the Kagera River for asylum in Uganda, while those whom they were fleeing with carefully chose not to pursue them any further but instead fled to Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo for asylum. At the same time, the former Batutsi refugees were trekking back, behind the RPF lines, replacing the fleeing and the dying Bahutu and Batutsi.

In a context where state power leads to economic power and where those in its control are not ready to relinquish it, the object of those outside it is to grab it at whatever cost using whichever means. This underlies the permanent fears of resistance. It also explains why those in state control use their privileged position to unearth and disperse such resistance through force, infiltration, manipulation or bribery. It is these dynamics which have transformed and retained the states in Africa into sharply contested domains. Indeed, Rwanda's ethnicised politics, movements, struggles and massacres reinforce this view. The recurrent violence dating from 1959 ruptured the Rwandan social, political, economic, military, intellectual and ideological order and impaired its capacity to develop. While the initial rupture decimated Batutsi and forced many others into exile, resulting in a corresponding shift of power from the Batutsi feudal monarchy to the majority Bahutu, the 1994 saw the repeat of the decimation of Batutsi but with the opposite result of returning power to the Batutsi. This paper is

concerned with the historical origins, dynamics and development of this holocaust and its perpetrators.

DISCOURSES ON THE RWANDA CRISES

There have been a variety of discourses and debates on this crisis. These have included some by Christian fanatics who see the genocide as signs of the end of the world by the "magic year" 2000. Others try to explain it in the western derogatory and pejorative lenses of "African cannibalism", "tribalism", "communalism", "ethnicity" — concepts which are reflective of unformed "primitives" and "savages". To avoid the danger of falling into these traps or becoming prisoner to sentimentalism and superficiality, scholarship about the crisis requires intellectual sobriety. As the "African Analysis" of April 1994 explained, this conflict was not purely tribal despite the dominance of the Batutsi in the RPF leadership.³ It exposed the rampant corruption, repression, famines, the leadership crisis and power struggles in Rwanda. Habyarimana had lost political initiative and state control to his wife Kanziga and her clan. Then, another discourse tries to externalise the causes of this crisis. Its main argument states that the extremists fronted French and Belgian interests while the RPF fronted the US and British interests. However, of interest to this study is the discourse by Dr. Maurice King *et. al.* which internalises its focus and ends up blaming the victims as the cause.

Dr. King has initiated a debate arguing that the holocaust in Rwanda was not due to political or tribal enmity but rather arose from the demographic trap.⁴ Rwanda is blamed for not heeding Belgium's warning to limit her population to seven million people. King locates this "demographic trap" in "African taboos" which prohibit discussions on the number of children in families. He extends warnings of an impending replica of this genocide in Uganda, citing land wrangles in Kigezi and Mbale as its signifiers. He universalises the western monogamous one-kid families for such crises. Yet, he fails to explain the extent to which economic and social crises per se can bring about struggles or genocide, the locus of subjective factors, and why past disasters had not caused holocausts.

Any blanket acceptance of the Belgian version of the advice would lapse the study into outright naivete much as restricting it to the population question obscures the crises' various dimensions and dynamics. Belgium has been a key player in Rwanda's divide and rule politics since 1919. When King Musunga refused to oblige, Belgium deposed him in 1931 and installed his young son Rudahigwa. Through their machinations and

threats, the young king converted to Christianity and most Batutsi followed suit. Belgium then gained leverage over Rwanda's politics, dictating much more effectively through their stooge king.

Historically, the Belgians were responsible for introducing racism through indirect rule and pitting the Batutsi against the Bahutu by initiating and keeping ablaze an artificial Bahutu-Batutsi enmity. This underlay their paratroopers' 1959 decimation of the Batutsi, and demolition of the Batutsi hegemony, thus extemporaneously uplifting the Bahutu from political marginality. That marked the foundations for the crises of independent Rwanda. Belgium protractedly maintained a conspicuous conspiratorial silence of the atrocities by the Parmehutu and later the MRND dictatorships.⁵ Upon the outbreak of the 1990 war, she failed to reprimand the MRND against the genocidal plot. The intended victims were also left in the dark. There is no evidence that Belgium made efforts to inform and pressurise the UN Security Council for a resolution condemning the plot.

As the longest imperialist power in Rwanda, Belgium never attempted to resolve this conflict impartially.⁶ It failed to empower the Rwandese intellectually, which explains the Rwandese' failure to study their problems as is reflected in their dependence on Belgian intellectualism.⁷ Belgium's constant meddling in Rwanda's politics explains why the peasantry could not heed its externally conceived advice. Such a utopian solution ignored diachronically Rwanda's political, social, cultural and demographic considerations. Given the prevalent mutual suspicion between the Belgians and the Rwandese, and the local population being predominantly Catholic, that advice was bound to fail. Above all, the Rwandese themselves were not blind to the fact that countries considered overpopulated like China and India had solved the food question and were exporting food to other parts of the world, Rwanda inclusive.

Despite "forced production", Belgium did not take steps to assist colonial and post colonial Rwanda with efficient scientific methods of production to address her basic food question. To date, much of her fertile land is still detained by coffee and tea for export, national parks and game reserves at the expense of food production.

King's overzealousness to blame the victim and glorify such a human tragedy as an inevitable natural population check obscures him from seeing the role of external exploitation. This calls for radical shifts methodologically, conceptually, analytically and epistemologically from his approach.

Rwanda's land policies and the drive for foreign currency earnings through environment, exports, tourism contributed to the agrarian

problems. The state had nationalised the land and divided it into parcels. It organised the peasants into communes and gave them part of this land. Through this mechanism, she was able to reserve a lot of land in the form of forest reserves and game parks. This sealed off the historical process of land inheritance and agricultural expansion through land reclamation. This was also complicated by the already fixed borders which had effaced the possibilities of free emigration. By 1990, the agrarian setting was faced with massive landlessness, poverty and unemployment. These fomented social grievances, anger and frustrations. With this was the perpetuation of the praxis of clientship to political patrons for "protection and vertical mobility". All these show how the Rwanda's crisis can never be explained by any single variable.

THE HISTORY OF RWANDA

The history of Rwanda traces centuries back when classes and the state came into formation there.⁸ The process of state formation is attributed to a pastoral group which came to call itself Banyiginya. This was a lineage within the larger pastoral community, known as Batutsi. It is this group which controlled economic and political power.

In the process of incorporating the various conquered peoples into one people, the ruling group systematically neutralised and reduced all these people's identities to three categories, basing on the people's modes of production. Those who derived their livelihood from agriculture became known as Bahutu, the pastoralists became known as Batutsi while those still predominantly engaged in rudimentary occupations like hunting, gathering or pottery became known as the Batwa. The latter category could be hired by the King, or the wealthy Batutsi for low-rated or military assignments. These groups were also classified in lineages and clans, with totems. Their area of jurisdiction became known as Rwanda, and its inhabitants Banyarwanda. There were no fixed class strictures and social mobility was possible between the Bahutu and the Batutsi groups. This was through intermarriages, raids and warfare. This transformative process became complete with the imposition of the ruling language onto them. This language was Kinyarwanda and the state religion was Emandwa. The long-term effect of this process was the undermining and erasing of the identities of these newly-incorporated peoples. The expansion of the Rwanda state also expanded this political arrangement and gradually became institutionalised as the political formula. It was on this basis that the Bahutu chiefs were later to become hereditary members of the Batutsi elite in the 1930s and the 1940s.

The construction of the dominant Batutsi ideology can be traced from mid 18th century following the centralisation and strengthening of the state, mainly by King Rwabugiri. The latter was accomplished through military defeats, duplicity, compliance or strategic alliances. In the process, some of the Bahutu kingdoms which were incorporated had their rulers replaced or retained and transformed into Batutsi. The wealthy Bahutu also underwent a similar process and became Batutsi while those who became impoverished through loss of cattle reverted to Buhutu. To achieve this, he narrowed the administrative hierarchy to the Batutsi group. This resulted in creating and sharpening conflicts between the Bahutu and the Batutsi. To retain this new grid, the ruling Banyiginya group moved fast to construct a genealogical history with supernatural claims to legitimise, hereditarianise and protect their rule. The King was assumed to have supernatural powers to travel underground whenever he was pursued by enemies, could leave footprints on rocks, etc. This construct projected a monolithic, historical trajectory of Rwanda, with a common socio-cultural, political and economic life, language and religion. By the time Rwanda lost her independence to imperial Germany in 1899, this genealogical history had become the ruling ideas. At the centre were noble lineages dominating power, while independent Bahutu chiefdoms existed in its fringes. The cow was the social power and basis for the Ubugake - a patron-client relationship in central Rwanda,⁹ while the Umuheto clientship dominated the periphery.¹⁰

The missionaries, colonialists and anthropologists appropriated the Batutsi ideological construct of the physique, expounded it within a new racial context, gave it new meanings and application. This was in line with the western search for interstices to penetrate and exploit Africa. In Rwanda, they invented the history of the Batutsi by premising on Speke's Hamitisation of the ruling Batutsi.¹¹ This was rooted in the western notion of Otherness — wherein all forms of civilisation were attributed to Europeans. This fallacy of linking physiological features with ethnicity and culture helped them to identify similarities between the western high cultures and high qualities within the Batutsi. Without taking pains to ask the Batutsi of their historical origins and religions, the missionaries claimed the Batutsi to have been Christians in the far past but had lost it due to migrations. They then based on this hypothesis to assign themselves the duty of reconverting them to Christianity.

German colonialism retained the long-established state structure under the king and the Batutsi ruling class though with some modifications.

Unlike the pre-colonial feudal state which had no defined borders, colonialism demarcated the territorial borders of Rwanda. There was no radical shift from this when Belgium was mandated the exclusive exploitative rights over Rwanda by the League of Nations in 1919. Belgium however modified the existing social formations and the mode of politics to serve her interests. Belgium introduced French as the ruling language, then went on to define and fix a rigid classification of the social groups of Rwanda.¹² To ensure the permanency of this classification, they produced and issued *indangamuntu* (identity cards) to all the Rwandese. The uniqueness of these identity cards was that they showed the bearers' ethnic grouping and that these class fixtures were hereditary. It is this racialisation and fragmentation of Rwanda which has had far-reaching destructive consequences on Rwanda.

In the subordination process of the pre-colonial ruling class to Belgian interests, the state underwent changes in form, content, leadership, specificity and functionality. One of its other far-reaching moves was to exclude all the Rwandese from certain domains: politics, the armed forces and the police, and further exclude the Bahutu and the Batwa from administration, education etc. It achieved the latter by singling out the Batutsi to man colonial administration at lower levels. The Batutsi exploited their compradorial positions politically, economically, socially and intellectually. They accessed and monopolised exploitation of resources, humiliated, oppressed, exploited and abused all those — Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa that colonialism had placed into subservience, and marginality. Topical among these was the exploitation of the abhorred unpaid forced labour system; act meting out of fines and penalties, and heavy taxation. It was these segregative privileges and the resulting malpractices that soon alienated them from the vast majority of the population. The economy gradually became monetised, with money replacing the cow as the social power, and wage labour replacing the Ubugake and Ubukonde. This intricate network solidified the elimination of the Bahutu and the Batwa from accessing resources.

All these reveal how Belgian colonialism bred social grievances, undermined the precolonial social relationships, eroded the Batutsi hegemony and rapport, and gradually brought about the urgency for the Bahutu's search for identity. Racism and western religion played key roles in exacerbating the crisis. Racial theory redefined sharply the meanings and usage of Bahutu and Batutsi concepts and these were to become the ruling ideas from then. In an effort to create a monolithic Rwanda, the post 1962 leadership made deliberate efforts to efface any remnant cultural and

economic identities. These included the ownership and inheritance of land, other languages, etc. That is how the Bakiga in northern Rwanda came to abandon Rukiga language and take up the ruling Kinyarwanda language.

THE LOCUS OF RELIGION IN RWANDA'S POLITICS

There were various religions in pre-colonial Rwanda, dominant among which was the Emandwa state religion. Christianity and the colonial authorities undermined these religions deliberately while promoting Christianity. Gradually, Catholicism replaced Emandwa as the state religion. It concentrated on the Bahutu, inculcating subservience and docility. Following the political climate that the Catholic Church enjoyed, it developed into a very strong economic force, with a very strong hegemony, and a key political actor in Rwanda's politics. That is how it ended up being embroiled in inter-ethnic conflicts, with sharp internalisation and institutionalisation of communal politics.

Confronted with the material, psychological and psychic realities in society, it at times transcended partisanship and became a material mobilising force in which the marginalised found shelter and expression. In other cases, it played reactionary, divisive roles. It continued to accomplish its self-relegated historical mission of producing cadres to run the state, the church, and the import-export economy. It produced and disseminated knowledge, ideas and ideologies, employed many people and helped others to get intellectual or gainful openings within and without. It brought into formation the "anti-Communist" Parmehutu party, helped in drafting the Parmehutu manifesto and adopting the anti-Batutsi, pro-imperialist politics of democracy without independence and in selecting its leadership. Typical among these was Kayibanda, secretary to Fr. Perradin, his former seminary teacher. With the emergence of the politics of decolonisation, Kayibanda seized the opportunity, used his position and connections to build his political career. The massive popular support, internal and external recommendations made him Rwanda's incontestable leader.

The shift of loyalty from the Belgian colonialists and the colonial train to their nationalistic programme occurred after the second world war, when the extremist monarchist Batutsi took a nationalistic stance and began demanding for independence from the Belgians. This took concrete shape when they formed the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR). However, these Batutsi's notion of independence was limited to the retention of Batutsi overrule without the Belgians on top or the Bahutu anywhere in the hierarchy. This was because they were trapped within the hamitic

ideology. They had been the historical administrators of Rwanda since the state inception. They were conscious of the implications of democracy which would transfer power to the Bahutu. This underlay these Batutsi novel nationalist, intellectual project of reconstructing a new history territorialising and hereditarianising their rule.

The colonialists and the Catholic church felt betrayed by the Batutsi, a group they had singled out and privileged since colonial inception. Apprehensive of the dangers being caused by the latter, who were wealthy, educated, experienced administrators, with international connections, the Belgians switched sides to the Bahutu to "lift" them out of their marginality and replace the Batutsi. They picked on ethnicity as the mobilising, liberating force and began to organise the Bahutu politically, intellectually and ideologically. Confronted by popular pressures, the king was forced to make political concessions to the Bahutu, beginning with the abolition of the Ubuhake and the Batutsi monopoly of leadership at lower levels. The local elections that followed resulted in the sounding defeat of the Batutsi. It was when the Batutsi extremists tried to reverse these achievements that they ignited the revolution. This was the genesis of the divided decolonisation politics in Rwanda. The Bahutu subalterns concretised their grievances and interests through the formation of the *Partie de l'Emancipation du Peuple Hutu* (Parmehutu). Their main aim was to counter the UNAR, create space for the Bahutu in the established colonial system and replace the Batutsi. Its broad political project involved the Bahutu's emancipation, social justice, broadening economic privileges and fighting communism. This was the bedrock for the Bahutu's landslide victory in the local elections and eliminating the Batutsi from politics. Belgium and the Catholic Church immediately endorsed these elections.

Rwanda's tragedy began unfolding cinematically immediately after King Mutara III died of poisoning in July 1959.¹³ The Belgian paratroopers immediately began to massacre the Batutsi in a bid to destroy their hegemony. A great number of the Bahutu then joined the killing spree. The ethnic violence enveloped the whole country and resulted in thousands of heinous massacres. The Bahutu then replaced the Batutsi in all the fields, and they endorsed their gains through the local elections in mid 1960, and the subsequent legislative elections, under the *facilitation* of the UN. The referendum of the elected members held in January 1961 endorsed these revolutionary achievements and declared Rwanda a republic. Belgium recognised it in October and granted Rwanda internal self-government three months later. The UN recognised it in July 1962. What is clear is

how Rwanda's politics had become so sharply ethnicised that no non-Muhutu would be elected by Bahutu. The Parmehutu enjoyed popularity at that historical moment.

Since the Catholic Church was a key actor in this whole process, it retained a central place in Rwanda's political, economic, social and intellectual domains. Religion in neo-colonial Rwanda became a means to political and economic resources. It neither acted as a service or an arm of the state *per se*, neither was it its check or its alternative, nor as an ecclesiastic institution for redemption and spiritual guidance. Habyarimana solidified this church-state alliance into a very dependable one, with the church controlling education and health within the state's grid. This eased the government expenditures. The "Bahutu" bishops became active members of the MRND leadership, with the Archbishop being a long-serving member of the MRND Central Executive Committee. Different members of the clergy belonged to the different MRND's development commissions. These took advantage of this church-state relationship to accumulate wealth. Faced with the RPF threat, the Bahutu clergy became extremists. None of these three groups could transcend the prevailing ethnicity of politics and unite the ethnically divided church. They had sharp differences in the perception and feelings about this war, on MRND's crimes and malpractices, on the material greed of the bishops and on the marginalisation of the different categories both in church and in politics. These divergent approaches with their simmering contradictions explain the church's indifference to the state-inspired crimes.¹⁴

DEMOCRACY WITHOUT INDEPENDENCE

The 1959 revolution was undermined by the absence of a wide Bahutu intelligentsia. This was to hinder this group from transforming this revolution into a social revolution for the vast majority, and democratising Rwanda's political life. Both Kayibanda and his successor Habyarimana failed to rebuild the country, heal the bleeding ethnic wounds, unite it and solve the refugee problem. They instead took complacency in the euphoria of Bahutu revolution and initiated patronage exclusively for their families and regions, leaving the rest outside the pale. The Parmehutu government had retained the colonial structures and the Ubukonde clientship. The Indangamuntu became essential for denying the Batutsi security, education, employment, services, justice and entrance in the armed forces. Faced with this discrimination, some Batutsi were adopted by Bahutu protectors, others tried to find space in the economic, spiritual and intellectual

domains, while others lied or bribed to adopt the Bahutu identity.¹⁵

This negating and delegitimizing the Rwandans' concerns was one of Parmehutu's faulty foundations. This created an interstice for the Inyenzi Movement invasions between 1961 and 1966. The state unleashed terror and retribution in which over ten thousand Batutsi were massacred and others fled the country. This invasion increased enmity, tension and hostilities between the two groups and the Bahutu's resolve to defend their revolution. To solve this Inyenzi problem for good, the Rwandese forces crossed into the Democratic Republic of Congo and attacked their bases, killed many of them and forced others to flee helter skelter. Meanwhile, Kayibanda was on a crusade of liquidating internal opposition to clear ground for a dictatorship.

Being founded on faulty premises, both the Parmehutu and its successor, the MRND did not take long to be corrupt and dictatorial. Kayibanda usurped the constitutional powers by declaring a one-party state, controlling the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and the armed forces. On capturing power from Kayibanda, Habyarimana embraced and inherited the malpractices and praxes of this dictatorship. He then modified his *not* party military dictatorship two years later to a one-party military dictatorship, and began his politics of one presidential candidature. Faced with a multiplicity of internal and external pressures for multi-party politics, he pretended to succumb to them but in actuality refused them chance to galvanise and take over the leadership from him. All these created bases for the abuse of office, characterised with nepotism, corruption, graft, extortion, smuggling, etc. That was how Kayibanda's commune of nascence at one time had eight Ministers and a president. Habyarimana did not do better outside the Akazu.

He began by rationalising his discrimination of the Batutsi from university education through the ploy of regional and ethnic balance by allocating them 9% of the places at secondary level. This discriminative praxis was extended to all other state and government sectors. That's how at one point of his rule, there was no Mututsi among the 143 bourgmestres and in the armed forces, one Mututsi among the eleven prefets, one in Rwandese foreign missions, and in the cabinet. It would be erroneous to assume that this discrimination was applied on the Batutsi alone. At the regional level, Habyarimana began by reversing the Parmehutu's marginalisation of non-southern Bahutu to tilt the balance in favour of Bahutu from his northern region and reinvigorated it. These soon occupied the lucrative and prestigious sectors of the country. The Bahutu from

Gisenyi and Ruhengeri dominated the national political and economic life. They filled the security services, the civil service, education, scholarships abroad, etc. It is not surprising that a third of all the scholarships abroad went to students from Gisenyi in 1987-88, while the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Kigali out of the total eleven could receive more than half of the national budget for regional government and development. The MRND politicians personalised the state and public resources.

The criteria for inclusion or exclusion remained consanguinity, regionalism, marriage, professionalism, business, etc. The gradual expansion of the evolves class through education, coupled with diminishing resources gradually narrowed this circle to the families of the Habyarimanas, Kanziga's nascent family, and other few cronies. This ruling clique came to be known as Akazu (a small house of eaters). They reincarnated the Belgian racial epistemisation of the Batutsi migration from Ethiopia and their subsequent overlord over the Bahutu.¹⁶

This one-way flow of resources to the north west resulted in lop-sided development, giving rise to very sharp intra-Bahutu struggles, inter-regional struggles, etc. Confronted with these failures, the politicians tried to protect their positions by closing out the others. That's how the Rwanda state became the most contested terrain. There followed public outcries with corresponding state repression. It clamped on the critical papers, killed or jailed the journalists; banned papers and all forms of opposition politics. By 1975, the marginalisation of the Batutsi was complete.

These failures and malpractices of both the Parmehutu and the MRND embittered and frustrated the rest of the Rwandese left outside the pale. Faced with this horrific segregation, the Batutsi stayees created some space in church for economic, psychological and education purposes. Their continued intellectual and economic dominance caused envy among the Bahutu. Some non-southerners took it to be blessed by the Parmehutu government and resolved to flush the Batutsi out in 1972-73. This project is attributed to Kayibanda's Minister of Defence and Army commander, Major General Habyarimana with the object of discrediting the Parmehutu government so as to overthrow it, which he accomplished on July 5, 1973.

Habyarimana's move from no party politics to the MRND one-party rule in 1975 was seen as a positive step towards democracy, economic development and unity. He even promulgated a new national constitution three years later but with the aim of eliminating competitors, then presented himself as the only presidential candidate and won the elections of compulsory voting. Yet, these were cosmetic and therefore left untouched

Rwanda's basic problems. The agrarian question continued worsening as the peasants wallowed in horrifying squalor.

Historically, the state has been very crucial. Holding state power is a key to public resources — economic, political, social, military intellectual, information, etc. It further explains why any contrary views to the ruling ideas are construed as subversive and treasonous, and why power is contested in the trenches rather than through the polls. In the context of Rwanda, it also explains the genesis and dissemination of the genocidal ideology.

HISTORICISING THE RPF

The Batutsi transited from opulence to statelessness and influence. Once in exile, the Batutsi had to fend for themselves. To cope with this hard reality, they worked hard, became industrious, acquired education, skills, jobs, wealth, new experiences and outlooks, allies, and military training. That notwithstanding, they remained pre-occupied with the notion of returning home and designed different strategies to accomplish it. One section saw the way out in Maoist protracted guerrilla warfare. They indeed sent some people for training in guerrilla warfare in eastern Europe. On the other hand, the vast majority of refugees wanted to invade, defeat the government forces and restore their lost glory. They saw an urgency for the King to marry and produce an heir.¹⁷ It was this latter group which formed the Inyenzi Movement and made ceaseless abortive attacks on Rwanda between 1961 and 1966. Their weaknesses rose from "voluntarism" which lacked corresponding capacities, internal support, organisation, military training and appropriate weaponry to match that of the Belgian paratroopers. Since the Belgian colonial policy ostracised Rwandese from the armed forces, the Inyenzi could not have acquired proper military training and sophisticated weaponry within such a short time.

There were other developments outside Rwanda which undermined these refugees' organisation. In the 1960s, Rwandese students abroad formed the Association Generale des Etudiants Rwandaise, with the object of effecting changes in Rwanda. The most urgent was to repair the interstices which had ruptured the Rwandan society. However, these initiatives were undermined by Habyarimana's demagoguery for reforms and moral revolution after his coups. While this encouraged many refugees to return-being victims of nostalgia, some Batutsi stayees were fleeing his virulence. This created hostilities between the two types of refugees. Those intending to return were bitter with the in-coming ones, whom they considered to be undermining their plans to return. They claimed to be the

outside Rwanda and material resources; politicising their cause, raising their nationalist sentiments and military preparations. It was these activities and the RPF's intensive military recruitment that forced Major General Habyarimana to a negotiation table on the refugee question. Earlier on, he had rejected proposals for unconditional repatriation of refugees, and the eventual opening up of the Kagera National Park and the forest reserves for their settlement. The NRM went to the extent of indirect threats to Habyarimana when they invited him as the state guest at the celebrations where Rwigyema was commissioned to the rank of Major General. However, his obstinacy and obsession with power blocked him from reflecting on what this signified. Little did both Rwandese Major Generals know that their fate and resultant death lay in factional struggles within their camps in the impending military contestation. Rwigyema's blood inaugurated the war hardly a day after the invasion while Habyarimana's blood climaxed it on the day the genocide was inaugurated. Rwigyema was killed by the RPF top commanders while Habyarimana was killed by the extremists in his Akazu.

PRELUDE TO THE RPF/RWANDESE WAR

By October, 1990, the RPF had infiltrated Rwanda's security. Thanks to the NRM and MRND government's joint initiation of the Kigali-Kampala bus services, in which many RPF operatives reconnoitered in Rwanda and ferried Rwandese from Rwanda to Uganda for military training. This was augmented by the direct telephone communication after the installation of the satellite communication system at Kabale. Another intelligence network was established through magendo — cross-border trade, wage labour, tourism, and casual visits. On its part, the MRND government through similar methods infiltrated both the NRA and RPF. It sent spies and used local informers, who came disguised as resettlers, refugees, or patients seeking medical treatment. As such, Habyarimana's proclamations for political reforms six days before the RPF invasion were based on the information obtained by this spying network. That pronouncement aimed at undermining the internal forces which were galvanised into a formidable political threat, forestalling the impending RPF military invasion, and disarming the western pressures for democracy. The west unceasingly pressurised the MRND for multiparty democracy in a bid to disarm the RPF while promoting the growing internal opposition.

Once in action, the RPF proved a superior force to the Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR). The MRND's woes were worsened by its misplaced external

hopes. This was because Belgium could not continue supporting Rwanda overtly due to the restrictions by her laws. Worse still, the Congolese soldiers proved excellent looters rather than fighters. It was only France which attempted a timely contingent intervention by flying in troops from N'djamena and France to beat off the RPF forces and stabilise Rwanda.

BUSH-CLEARING²¹ TO FILL THE HALF-EMPTY GRAVES

Seen broadly, the Bahutu's act of overthrowing the Batutsi overrule and hegemony in the 1959 revolution had elevated them to higher societal echelons. Despite the subsequent failures of the Bahutu leadership and the inability to transform this revolution into a meaningful social revolution for the vast majority, still, the return of the Batutsi overrule was the greatest unwelcome insult and humiliation to the Bahutu as individuals and as a people. It is this historical reality that the extremists invoked and capitalised on to propagate the genocide, by appropriating and deploying the western constructed notions of ethnicity and tribalism. Their anti-Batutsi ideology metamorphosed into a dangerous material moving force.

However, the invasion largely affected the north and north-western Rwanda. The war disrupted their historical, production and other economic processes, threatened their wealth, investments, education and privileges. The Bahutu from these areas largely dominated the front line. Isms like regionalism, nepotism, tribalism and ethnicity came into play, with most of the major promotions to higher ranks in the FAR based on regionalism, nepotism, blood relations and other isms. That was the genesis of the new Bahutu extremism. Their loci in Rwanda's politics and economy, coupled with their mechanistic approach to various demands, when confronted with the RPF militancy guided them in constructing the genocidal ideology. All this was catalysed by the rise of a strong internal opposition in central and southern Rwanda, where the councillors of commune Kibilira resolved to wipe out the Batutsi in response to the war. They then instigated the Bahutu to massacre the Batutsi and butcher their cattle. Within a short time, 348 Batutsi were decimated. The Kigali-based politicians hailing from the Northwest tried to follow this line of action by unsuccessfully ordering the local administrators to incite the local Bahutu and wipe out the Batutsi. To enlist the local participation and absolve itself and government of the massacres, the FAR staged a mock RPF attack on the FAR, aimed at painting RPF as the aggressor. It then invited Bahutu peasants to join the Batutsi killing spree. Anti-Batutsi propaganda spread by the extremists through public meetings and the media preceded the killings; to prepare

the psychological ground for the incoming troops and the Interahamwe. Despite their official sanctioning, the extremists' national plot of ethnic cleansing still flopped.

The state-sponsored heinous massacre of the Batutsi and the opposition members thus looks back to the RPF invasion. Significant though, the initial method of identifying the genocide victims was based on identity cards, but this flopped because many Batutsi had changed identity to Bahutu. The other methodology of basing on one's ancestry was handicapped by subjectivity, lapse of memory, or the local people's unwillingness to co-operate. Above all, it was time consuming to the *genocidaires*, thus, the extremists interim government's genocidal appeal to the local people through radio broadcasts. Similarly, identification basing on physical appearance was undermined by the inherent weaknesses within spontaneity, subjectivity, vendetta and ignorance. That way, many Bahutu with features akin to the Batutsi were decimated. The FAR instrumentally created suitable conditions for the genocide by training and arming Interahamwe against unarmed Batutsi and holding off the RPF for some time.²²

The genocide was unleashed when the extremists took full control of the state power moments after Habyarimana's death. Guns, grenades, machetes, massues (nail-studded clubs), sticks, spears, bows and arrows, manifested the extreme brutality, anger vengeance, malice, savagery and horror that underlined the killings. Through satellites, powerful cameras and other coverage, the international community just watched unmoved on their screens the "savages" wiping themselves out.

CONCLUSION

The Rwanda crisis traces from German imperialism, with its racial indirect rule through the Batutsi compradors. However, Rwanda's actual destruction commenced in late 1950s, when the Parmehutu sailed in rivers of Batutsi blood to receive the reigns of power from the Belgian colonialists. Since then, Rwanda was characterised by discrimination, corruption, nepotism, regionalism, duplicity, mass murders and genocide. All these gave rise to reactionary, self-interested Bahutu extremism. This crisis arose from the extremists' conception of "Net-work zero" under the coordination of the Habyarimanas, Kanziga's nascent family and relatives.²³ That set up, coordinated and equipped the *genocidaires* the Interahamwe, the Impozamugambi, the GP, and the *gendermaire*, etc. They skilfully attributed Habyarimana's assassination to the RPF to ignite the systematic genocide for the rapid elimination of the Batutsi.

The events in Rwanda since the late 1950s exposed religions as Christianity became riddled with ethnic politics and its top leadership sunk into MRND Bahutu politics. The error of the Parmehutu delinking democracy from nationalism, seeking it without independence cost Rwanda very dearly. That is not to argue that a similar crisis would not have occurred if they had asked for nationalism with democracy, but rather, that after losing the initial opportunity for genuine independence, Rwanda never regained that opportunity. The crises only reveal the inseparability of these two. It was this exclusion that unpatriotically deligitimated the people's concerns in favour of dictatorships. The Parmehutu government and its successor, the MRND developed into dictatorships without any internal opposition. Their governance became riddled with massive discrimination, corruption, repression and death. All these became a fertile ground for the refugee crisis. While the Parmehutu government could beat off the Batutsi under the Inyenzi movement in the 1960s, it became practically impossible for the alienated, corrupt, discriminative MRND leadership to beat off the RPF military invasion. To make this a loss for the Batutsi, they resolved to kill all the Enyanga Rwanda (enemies of Rwanda). These had been defined as all the Batutsi and any other person that clamoured for democratic rule.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. From RPF: "Rwanda: Background to Genocide", June 1994.
2. Ogen Kevin Aliro's interview with King Kigeli in the US in the Sunday Monitor of 10/11/96 Kigeli traces Rwanda's history from King Gihanga's rule dating from 1081-1114.
3. Africa Analysis, No. 195 of 15/4/1994.
4. "The Monitor Newspaper", Kampala dated December 7, 1996.
5. The Belgian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence face lawsuits from the families of some victims in the genocide, for failing to act when they received information about the impending genocide three months before.
6. The Daily Nation of Kenya on 2/4/1991 castigated Belgium for her permanent failure to solve this problem.
7. RPF, "Rwanda: Background to Genocide", June 1994.
8. Ogen Kevin Aliro's interview with King Kigeli, 1996, *op. cit.*
9. Ubuhake was derived from the clientship in the production of wealth for the patron. Okuhakwa is a condition of being in bondage. The Mututsi patron would offer or promise a cow to a Muhutu peasant, and guarantee him protection. The recipient would on this promise expend unpaid labour to the

- benefactor in different forms. This form of social relationship was highly exploitative, oppressive and degrading. In this clientage, the patron extracted the surplus labour from the client without the client's corresponding gains. The client could not easily break away from this bondage as he was tied by the cow to the donor. Though there were some safeguards within this arrangement, the patron could take away the cow and its offsprings from the recipient without redress or compensation for his labour.
10. Umuheto clientele was a relationship in which the lower people donated cattle to the chiefs/patrons. The cultivators donated food, artifacts, etc. to the Bahutu patrons.
 11. In amazement of the political, economic, and social development of the feudal Rwanda, H. Speke, on his journey in Central Africa in the 19th century was trapped into the euro-centric casuistry of attributing any form of civilisation outside Europe to descendants of Europeans. That's how Speke speculated that the founders of such a strong Rwanda state were descendants of Noah's son, Ham.
 12. It did this through the 1933-34 country-wide census. This census was cattle-based. Those with more than nine cows became classified as Batutsi, while those with less or none became classified as Bahutu. Those derogatorily called Batwa retained that categorisation.
 13. Ogen Kevin Aliro's interview with Kigeli, *op. cit.* argues that King Mutara was assassinated through poisoned injection because of his nationalist anti-colonial demands. His death occurred a day before leaving to demand Rwanda's independence from the UN General Assembly.
 14. In December 1991, Bishop T. Nsengiyumva, of Kabgayi, accused the Church of being compromised to silence through material rewards, positions and corruption. He castigated them for neglecting the laity, then attacked the state and the RPF for the war. His letter forced others to begin discussing this crisis and its possible solutions. However, they could not transcend their MRND Bahutu sentiments as was revealed later through Bishop Vincent Nsengiyumva's accusation of Uganda for attacking the Rwandese democratic leadership.
 15. They were some of these or the progenies of the intermarriages between Bahutu and Batutsi that were most active Interahamwe in the 1990-1994 horrendous holocaust. The most topical of these was Robert Kajuga, the overall commander of the Interahamwe. His parents had changed identity to Bahutu.
 16. This position has also been held by a pro-monarchy Batutsi for opposite reasons. These relish and romanticise the past monarchical establishment with the aim of reinstating it. See Ogen, Kevin Aliro, (*op. cit.*). Another major discourse spearheaded by the RPF sees no difference between the two groups but as the same people, sharing the same language, culture, territory, economy, problems and programs, oppressors and exploiters, etc. See the RPF Publications, (*op. cit.*)

17. Rwanda's feudal tradition prohibited kings from marrying while in exile. Here, thanks go to Amon Kayunga, Ignace Semana and his brother Vedasta, Mukotanyi Gaudious and Jean Bazimya, who revealed to me important information on Rwanda's kingship.
18. These areas included Nakivale, Kahunga and Orukinga. At Namutamba, he addressed them at Namutamba Teacher Training College.
19. The most notorious one was the Mukura incident in Kumi District, where Major Bunyenyezi, of Rwandese origin and other officers rounded up 276 civilian youths from six parishes, then put them in old train coaches for three days. When they opened the couches, sixty nine of them had died of suffocation. They then buried them in shallow mass graves. This fuelled enmity between the locals and the Rwandese combatants. See The New Vision, Kampala, of July 17, 1989 & August 8, 1989.
20. His guerrilla warfare career began in 1970s, in FRELIMO, Mozambique, against the Portuguese imperialism. He later combined with other Ugandan combatants in Tanzania, formed FRONASA to fight Amin's dictatorship. When amin's government fell in 1979, Rwigyema joined the NRA to fight against the UNLA and its Tanzanian and Korean allies, 1981-1986. After NRA's capture of state power, he rose to the rank of Major General, became Deputy Minister of Defence, etc. However, he spent most of the time in counter-insurgency in the north and north-eastern Uganda. This is where he and the other RPF commanders concretised their home-going preparations, took the RPF recruits for combat-hardening before the invasion.
21. The concept "Clearing the bush" was borrowed from the 1959 programs. Its usage in the 1990s was aimed at collapsing time so as to create an impression that this was a continuation of the 1959 revolution.
22. The GP was the most notorious. It was composed of over 1,500 troops, hailing from the home area of the Habyarimanas. This GP was organised, trained and armed by Belgium and France.
23. Agathe Kanziga, a very active member of CDR is accused of initiating state support for the negative, anti-nationalist press, spearheading and coordinating the pre-April 6, 1994 killings and state terrorism in Rwanda.

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