

MAWAZO
A Journal of
Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences
Makerere University

MAWAZO
A Journal of the Faculties of Arts and
Social Sciences
Makerere University

Subscriptions
MAWAZO is published twice a year. Subscription rates including surface mail postage are:

Foreign

	Per Issue	Per 2 Year Volumes
Individuals	US \$ 10	US \$ 32
Institutions	US \$ 20	US \$ 64

Local

	Per Issue	Per 2 Year Volumes
Individuals	8,000/=	30,000/=
Institutions	10,000/=	60,000/=

* Foreign subscribers wishing to receive their copy by airmail should send an additional US \$ 6 per issue.

Subscriptions should be sent to:

MAWAZO
P. O. Box 7062
Kampala, Uganda
Tel: 545040

Membership to MAWAZO Donors' Club is open to individuals who wish to support the Journal financially. All inquiries should be directed to the Editor/Chairperson, MAWAZO, Makerere University.

© Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences
Makerere University
P. O. Box 7062
Kampala
2002

ISSN 9970-05-005-2

Contents

<i>Murindwa-Rutanga</i>	The Effects of the 1990-1994 RPF— Rwanda War on the Agrarian Crisis in Kigezi
<i>Charles N. Bwana</i>	Indigenous Cultures under Siege: The Role of Globalization and Information Technology..... in Third World Countries.....
<i>S. Maghimbi</i>	A Critique of Sociological Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam.....
<i>E.J Walakira,</i>	Worst Forms of Child Labour in Uganda: An Investigation into Commercial Sex Exploitation of Children.....
<i>Gilbert M. Khadiagala</i>	The Geopolitics of Africa's Great Lakes Region
<i>Peter Rwagara Atekyereza</i>	The Rationality of Traditional Marriage Process Among the Bakiga of Uganda.....
<i>Arsene, M. Balihuta</i>	The Capacity of Urban Local Governments to Promote Economic Development under Decentralization
<i>Yasin A.A. Olum</i>	The Relationship Between the Parliament and the Executive: The Case of the No-Party System in Uganda.....
<i>W.D Gombya-Ssembajje and J.R.S. Kaboggoza</i>	Management of Open Woodlands in Uganda: The effectiveness of the Forest Department of the Ministry of Lands, Water and Natural Resources
<i>Munhuweyi Peresuh and Vimbai S.M. Zhou</i>	Street Children in the City of Harare, Zimbabwe: Their Backgrounds Lifestyles and Aspirations.....
Book Reviews

Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor/Chairperson

A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinyawa

Deputy Editor/Chairperson

James Kigongo

Secretary

Murindwa-Rutanga

Members

Grace Bantebya

Okot Benga

A. Nkusi

EDITORIAL BOARD OF ADVISORS

Amartya Sen	-	UK	Karmal Karunayake	-	Sri Lanka
Adebayo-Olukoshi	-	CODESRIA	Kiyaga-Nsubuga	-	Uganda
Ali Mazrui	-	USA	Mahmood Mamdani	-	USA
Aseka Eric Masinde	-	Kenya	Micere Githae Mugo	-	USA
Anders Narman	-	Sweden	Nakanyike Musisi	-	Uganda
Partha Chatterjee	-	India	Pearl Robinson	-	USA
Göran Hyden	-	USA	Rwekaza Mukandala	-	Tanzania
Jomo Kwame S.	-	Malaysia	P. J. M. Sebuwufu	-	Uganda
Jashodhara Bagchi	-	India	Tim Shaw	-	UK
Julius Ihonvbere	-	Nigeria	Tiyambe P. Zeleza	-	USA

EDITOR'S NOTE

MAWAZO as an academic journal of the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences came into being in the second half of the 1960s as a replacement for a journal published by the two faculties under the title MAKERERE JOURNAL.

The rather esoteric title (at least for Ugandans) was derived, according to its very first issue, from the Swahili word "Mawazo" (Singular "Wazo") – a comprehensive Kiswahili word covering the following activities of the mind:

- Meditations
- Reflections
- Thoughts
- Opinions
- Ideas

Those were the days in which, to parody Ali Mazrui of "Tanzaphilia" fame, there was a lot of "Swahiliphilia" or love and good will for the Kiswahili language. The title has stuck up to these days even long after the departure in the early 1970's of the "Swahiliphils," who were largely expatriates from abroad.

The first issue of the journal, Vol. No. 1, appeared in June 1967; and carried articles as diverse and highbrow as the following:

Contents

Africa's March to Unity: the role of the University	Kenneth Kaunda
What are Universities for?	Peter Marris
Some Thoughts on Nationalism	Basil Davidson
The English Language and the origins of African Nationalism	Ali A. Mazrui
The Resurrection of Political Economy	James S. Coleman
The role of symbols in the Tanzania Election of 1965	Göran Hyden
A Lament for Nigeria	Reginald H. Green

Book Reviews

Toward a Fax Africana, by Ali Mazrui	Rupert Emerson
Introduction to African Art, by Boris de Rachelwitz	J.H. Chaplin
Song of Lawino, by Okot p'Bitek	Paul Theroux

It also featured some excellent book reviews, as may be seen from above, as well as advertisements of intellectual/academic interests, such as new books by publishing presses and firms.

The journal was intended as a quarterly, to appear in four issues per volume in any one single year.

Regrettably, it was swept overboard by the turbulent winds of political instability and anti-intellectualism that affected intellectual life very negatively in the 1970's, following the ascent of Idi Amin to state power in January 1971.

It arose feebly later on in the latter part of the Amin regime, tottered on uncertainly, and relapsed once again into dormancy; was revived after the fall of Idi Amin; but collapsed once again, not to be revived again until 1984.

This Editorial Board now has the duty to tend to the newly resurrected journal; to make it prosper; and to hand it over in one whole piece to their successors when their duration of service comes to its end in due course. That is our challenge.

A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinyicwa

June, 2002

The Effects of the 1990-1994 RPF¹ - Rwanda War on the Agrarian Crisis in Kigezi²

Murindwa-Rutanga (Ph.D)*

Background to the RPF-Rwanda War

The period between October 1, 1990 and April 1994 witnessed a disastrous war in Rwanda, between the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) or *Inkotanyi* and the joint Rwanda armed forces together with armed sections of society, notably the *Interahamwe*. This war resulted in the horrendous and heinous killing of over eight hundred thousand people, and the mass fleeing of over two million Rwandans into exile as the RPF routed the ruling *Mouvement Republicain Nationale Pour la Democratie et le Developpement* (MRND) regime from state power in Rwanda. The unique genocidal characteristic of this war was to have serious tragic consequences for the entire Rwandan society. This was exacerbated by the decision of the defeated regime to smash the pillars of the existing state machinery so as to ensure that these structures and resources were not inherited cleanly by the RPF.

Although the final developments of this war took place in the central, southern and south-western parts of Rwanda, in the first two years the fighting was concentrated in northern Rwanda, along the border with Uganda. This was a result of the war's historical development. The RPF guerrilla movement which launched the war on October 1, 1990, was a movement of Rwandans in the diaspora which used Uganda as a planning base and launching-pad. Hence the RPF was predominantly composed of Batutsi refugees who had been resident in Uganda and the other East African countries. The war, which started off as a conventional military invasion, had to assume guerrilla tactics after the initial RPF assault was checked by the Kigali regime's

forces.

Faced with this invasion, the Kigali regime responded with horrendous, bloody reprisals on certain sections of society within Rwanda. Notable among these were those who were amenable to invading refugees — mainly from the Batutsi social grouping and any Bahutu with dissenting or moderate political ideas; those who in the recent past had started clamouring for change of government through multiparty democracy and who were opposed to the MRND rule under Habyarimana. The regime resurrected and regenerated the old anti-Batutsi sentiments and gradually constructed a murder ideology. It proceeded to unleash a widespread ethnic-cleansing campaign, which culminated in the 1994 genocide.

Kigezi is in the south-western part of Uganda bordering Rwanda in the south and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west. Kigezi came into existence as a politico-administrative unit through the 1911 Anglo-German-Belgian Agreement. It remained a single politico-administrative unit as a district until 1975 when it was divided into North Kigezi District and South Kigezi District by the Amin regime. Both these districts changed names to Rukungiri District and Kabale District respectively after the fall of the Amin regime in 1979. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government created a third district, Kisoro, from the same region in 1993. The main guiding principle in the demarcations were mainly linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences. Thus, Kigezi comprises three districts — Kabale, Kisoro and Rukungiri.

Kigezi has been confronted with an acute agrarian crisis which was first detected by the colonial government. This is manifested *inter alia* by a series

* Senior Lecturer and Head of the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Makerere University.

land question, lack of employment opportunities for the population, lack of implements of production, use of rudimentary forms and methods of production, persistent problems of food insecurity, malnutrition, human diseases, crop and animal pathogens. All these have transformed Kigezi into a fertile ground for persistent widespread land struggles, homicides, criminality, alcoholism, chronic starvation, malnutrition and diseases, thefts and robberies. It is this region confronted with the onslaught of such a vicious agrarian crisis that also faced the virulence and malignance of the RPF-Rwanda war. This article examines the reasons why this war reached Kigezi, the process through which it reached there, its course, impact and effects on the agrarian economy and the entire social and economic life in the area.

In reconstructing this war, the study relied mainly on articles in the print media, official documents, information by some key respondents and other members of the community and on the author's personal experience. While the print media gave this war wide coverage right from its inception to its conclusion, the respondents to this study witnessed its inception and unfolding. While some of them played some roles in it, others suffered its multifaceted virulence. Our object in trying to reconstruct this war is to understand it in relation to the agrarian crisis in Kigezi. This is a major shift from the numerous studies on the Rwanda war, which have ignored or sidelined the impact of this war on Kigezi by confining their focus to the war inside Rwanda, the resultant three-month systematic genocide and the subsequent refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania. Such studies completely ignore the bitter war that initially raged along the Uganda-Rwanda border.³ To ignore this has the effect of suppressing the human tragedy and suffering that this war caused for the people in Kigezi.

Various factors combined to draw Kigezi into this war. Kigezi shares a border with Rwanda. As such, any military activities along the border will affect Kigezi. This trend can be traced to 1959, when a lot of Rwandan Barutsi fled the Bahutu massacres in

Rwanda to Uganda. They integrated with the local communities in Uganda, developed new relations, and took part in the socio-economic and political life of Uganda. This was to play a crucial role in their preparation for the guerrilla operations in Rwanda, as they could criss-cross the Uganda-Rwanda border undetected. The involvement of some Rwandan youth in liberation struggles gained momentum with the recruitment of young men like Fred Rwigyema, who was trained by Museveni's FRONASA in Mozambique in the 1970s, courtesy of facilities extended by Frelimo. This group became active in the struggles against Amin's regime. It joined with the Tanzanian People's Defence Forces (TPDF) and other Ugandan exiles to invade Uganda in 1978/79 and overthrow Idi Amin's regime. The Ugandan exiles had formed the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). This movement took over the instruments of government after the fall of the Amin regime.

When the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) dismantled the UNLF's political equation and Obote came back to power in 1980, the FRONASA leadership, under Yoweri Museveni, decided to wage a guerrilla war against the second Obote government. This gave birth to the National Resistance Army (NRA). This new guerrilla movement opened military opportunities for the exiled Rwandan youth. The process was accelerated by the 1982 forced mass repatriation of Rwandan refugees by the Obote II government. Though not conditional, the Rwandans' joining of the NRA became programmatic. Their object was to acquire military skills, defeat the Obote dictatorship, and create conducive conditions for fighting against the Kigali regime. It was against this background that the RPF emerged, more especially after Rwandan youth had fought with the NRA to overthrow the Obote II regime.

Kigezi's geographical location dictated its involvement in this war. The border area became the terrain where the RPF/Rwandan military contestation for Rwanda initially took place. It was here that the RPF grew in military strength as the Rwandan armed forces were losing in numbers, strength and

morale. Though the RPF had initially invaded Rwanda through Ntungamo District, the subsequent military activities spread and concentrated along the mountainous Kigezi-Rwanda border. This was dictated by various factors. The RPF invasion of Rwanda had forced the Kigali regime to concentrate its forces on the Rwanda-Ntungamo border. The object was to seal off the border and cut off supplies and reinforcements from Uganda to the RPF. But the RPF's mobile guerrilla activities soon paralysed the small Rwandan army, which by then was estimated at 5,000 strong. This border is open and entry into either of the two countries can be gained at any point any time. It was partly due to that open border that the Rwandan forces became paralysed by the RPF attacks from different points. What increased the anger of the Rwandan forces and inflamed their rage was that the RPF had invaded Rwanda from Uganda. It was inflicting continuous defeats on them with a heavy death toll. They were sure that the RPF was continuing its attacks on them from Uganda. Whether for fact or for propaganda purposes, the Kigali regime maintained accusations that it was Uganda that had invaded Rwanda. This is beyond the scope of this study.

Flabbergasted and infuriated by the RPF's incessant guerrilla attacks, and the resultant population displacements and famines in Rwanda, the Rwandan forces adopted a multi-pronged approach of warding off the guerrillas, decimating anybody suspected of being a potential supporter or sympathiser of the RPF while also attacking Uganda. Whereas it was easy for the Rwandan forces and civilians to use rudimentary tools to eliminate the first category, to beat off the RPF guerrillas and punish Uganda for its complicity in this war, they also required heavy artillery and sophisticated terror tactics through abductions and incursions. The Rwanda government seems to have hoped that these reprisals would force Uganda to stop supporting the RPF. Its other calculation seems to have been to draw Uganda into a retaliatory belligerence, which would lure it into invading Rwanda. The aim here would be to expose Uganda as the aggressor. That would help to isolate Uganda internationally. The mountainous factor acted in favour of both warring parties. The RPF

took advantage of this terrain to infiltrate Rwanda from the mountains, valleys and ridges unnoticed. The RPF would encircle the Rwandan forces undetected, establish guerrilla bases within the mountains and use those mountainous locations to observe events in Rwanda and plan accordingly. On the other part, the Rwandan forces and their erstwhile allies — mainly France, Belgium and the then Zaire — took advantage of the strategic mountains overlooking Kigezi to monitor the area and shell it.

Kigezi became the site where the Habyarimana regime lost credibility due to its miscalculated move into Uganda's political traps. Uganda lured Rwanda to these pitfalls by leaving its side of the border unguarded. The Rwandan forces took advantage of this seeming openness of the border to wreak vengeance on the civilians across the border, through shellings, killings, incursions and abductions. They would force the peasants to flee the border area. The marauding Rwandan forces would then cross into Uganda to loot property. In the public eye, Uganda had left the field open for the RPF to invade Rwanda. It is, however, difficult to establish what was going on behind the scenes. What is on record is that Uganda made public outcries against Rwandan hostilities and urged the Kigali regime and the RPF to search for peaceful means to end the war.

While the politicians were playing these war games, the suffering peasants in Kigezi galvanised into an anti-Rwanda force. Kigezi had been linked with Rwanda by long historical, socio-cultural, kinship, marriage and economic ties. However, these ties insulated *magendo* (smuggling or illicit trade) between the two regions even in face of vigilant anti-smuggling measures by the post-1986 NRM government. Wanted criminals and politicians would hide across the border. This partly explains why the RPF's invasion of Rwanda had been received with concern, apprehension, and some resentment by the people of Kigezi. These ties and monetary gains led some individuals to form a fifth column in Rwanda.⁴ These ties were too fragile and too shallow to hold in the face of continued hostilities from across the border. They instead forced people in Kigezi to realise that their defence could only be

guaranteed by their nation-state. This realisation led them into an interiorised search for a belonging, for a nation. It is this which partly explains why such people, who were originally averse or lukewarm to the NRM government, began to urge the government to defend them against Rwanda. This was a demand for their rights from the state. Open debates emerged in Kigezi about these attacks and why the NRM could not defend them from Rwanda's aggression.

One argument was that Rwanda was attacking Uganda because it despised Uganda's military capacity. This argument could not hold mainly because Rwanda was not blind to the military capacity and fighting experience of the youthful UPDF. President Habyarimana had been invited as a State Guest at NRA celebrations in which Fred Rwigyema was promoted to the rank of Major General. It was this Major General who led the RPF's invasion of Rwanda.⁵ While some argued that Uganda was afraid of the Rwandan forces, others submitted that it was the NRM's sinister plan to punish the people of Kigezi for their weak support to the NRM government. Others even argued that it was the NRM that was attacking under the guise of the RPF. The NRM refused to retaliate as that would be misconstrued as Uganda's double attack of Rwanda. The RPF had defected from the NRA and some people were openly calling it a column of the NRA. It was not uncommon before the invasion to hear people call the NRA the Nkore-Rwanda Army.⁶ These issues could have guided the NRM government to move cautiously and avoid any action which could project it as a supportive force of the RPF. That is why it left Rwanda alone to continue accumulating political and diplomatic blunders.

On its part, Rwanda exonerated itself of blame for these hostilities by claiming that it was attacking the RPF positions. At one time, the leader of the Rwanda Border Monitoring Team, Lt. Col. François Munyen-gango, told foreign diplomats and journalists on the border inspection tour that Rwandan troops could see the RPF guerrillas attacking from Uganda. He exonerated Rwanda from the hostilities against Uganda by caustically and casuistically

attributing them to the RPF. He opined that the RPF could be shooting into Uganda with the motive of creating confusion between Rwanda and Uganda. He made a covert defence of the ongoing abductions and killings of Ugandans by accusing Ugandans of crossing into Rwanda to spy for the RPF. These accusations could not, however, be verified by the numerous international observers, Rwan-da's monitoring teams and ministerial delegations that traversed the whole border in search of the RPF guerrilla bases and training camps. Nor did the peasants in the affected areas support Rwanda's claims. They vehemently denied its charges that the RPF was operating from their area. They instead accused Rwanda of perpetrating ceaseless horrendous atrocities, crimes and killings. They pressed for Rwanda's compensation for their relatives that had been killed or injured by the Rwandan forces, and for the lost property.⁷ Our respondents gave a variety of views on the factors underlying these hostilities in their areas.

Sixteen respondents informed the study that this war forced Rwandan refugees to flee to Kigezi. The Rwandan forces, therefore, attacked Uganda to chase these refugees. This raises problems. If Rwanda was aware that the RPF was operating from Uganda, then why did the Rwandan forces concentrate on looting property, locally known as *kwaya*, instead of hunting for the RPF guerrillas? Four respondents justified looting as part of war, although two others rejected it as not being the real explanation. Four respondents alleged that the Rwandan forces were cruel, merciless killers, and undisciplined looters. They argued that the Rwandan forces would come with armed civilians to loot food, livestock and other property. The respondents concluded that it was this indiscipline that made the Rwandan forces lose the war to the disciplined RPF. These are claims that the study can neither prove nor dismiss. The respondents contrasted the Rwandan forces with the RPF, which was against looting as it had a focused mission of returning to their home country. Five respondents argued that the Rwandan forces were using all forms of desperate attacks to avert military defeats, while three respondents argued that the Rwandans believed that Uganda was in

involved in the war. In fact, two respondents went to the extent of reasoning that Uganda was directly involved in the war. These respondents alleged that the Rwandan forces attacked because the RPF had passed in their area. Four respondents argued that the Rwandan forces were desperately trying to block all possible entrances for the RPF. Two respondents explained that the Rwandan forces were infuriated by the fact that some people in the border areas joined the war and that the whole border area was populated by *inyangarwanda* (enemies of Rwanda).⁸ While two respondents attributed the attacks to the enmity between Uganda and Rwanda, other three respondents attributed it to the failure of the Kigali regime to reach an understanding with the Rwandan refugees on the issue of their unconditional return to Rwanda. Twenty-three respondents argued that the war reached their area because the fighting in Rwanda was initially concentrated along the Uganda-Rwanda border. One respondent put it succinctly and proverbially that *amaka agahikaine goosyana* (when a house catches fire, the fire spreads to the nearby houses). Ten respondents argued that the Rwandan forces were encouraged to carry out these hostilities mainly because Uganda had not yet deployed the UPDF to guard the border. Other four respondents attributed these hostilities to the fact that Rwanda underestimated the UPDF's military strength, weaponry and martial skills. They argued that the object of Rwandan forces was to capture Kabale.

Instead of privileging any of the above views over the others or rejecting any of them, it is beneficial for the study to consider them as a set of answers that constitute possible explanations for the Rwandan hostilities into Uganda. They may not be exhaustive, and some of them may be inaccurate or false; but in a situation where the facts remain hidden from the public, such answers from those who witnessed the war are important for a study that is trying to understand the facts and issues underlying that war and its effects on the agrarian crisis in Kigezi. The interest of this study is, however, confined to the understanding of this war in relation to the agrarian crisis in Kigezi.

The Trends of the War in Kigezi

The inception of the RPF-Rwanda war concentrated heavy fighting along the Uganda-Rwanda border. As fighting raged on, Kigezi soon experienced the consequences, for it became the object of attack. Education became one of its first victims. This was because students, teachers and other supportive staff deserted schools to join the RPF. Secondly, schools along the border closed immediately and the ongoing national examinations were affected. The students and pupils were shifted to safer centres. This involved new costs on the parents that had not been planned for. The war marred the peace and security in Kigezi, created confusion and discord and severed relations between the two countries. As the respondents explained, the war created conditions of destruction, suffering, turmoil and death in Kigezi. Terror, flight and death became common occurrences in this war situation.

While war creates further insecurity, war itself is a product of insecurity and fear. While it is true that peace may result from war, and force is the midwife of any old society pregnant with a new one, as Marx underlined,¹⁰ the basic fact is that the material conditions of insecurity reside in insecurity - whether socio-economic or political. Regardless of the costs incurred and the nature of victory - whether bounteous, fortuitous or pyrrhic - war and insecurity have material causes. They have their beneficiaries and victims. War and insecurity have historically been sources of wealth. War and insecurity express the violent primitive accumulation of wealth by those who invest in them. Historical evidence shows that the subalterns on both sides at war remain the victims - whether captured and taken as slaves, or killed and their property looted, women raped and abducted, or whether they become cannon fodder. War creates and unleashes new forms of insecurity even to those who are not party to it initially. Though widely distributed amongst the belligerent parties, insecurity tends to have greater devastating and perilous effects on the weaker sections of society. It is within this context that the peasants,

mainly the women, the children, the aged and the disabled have been the ones most affected by militarism.

The peasants' narrow confinement to their localities complicates their predicament. These localities constitute their working and living places, their agrarian property represents their life-time savings. Within this logic, their future depends on that property. Thus, the emergence of war and insecurity collapses the peasants' material world and shatters their hopes. The only weapon at their disposal is their ability to flee so as to save their lives. In certain situations, the state intervenes and herds the peasants into camps. This is normally the case when the state has a direct interest in the war. It may do so to separate the peasant population from the other warring parties such as insurgents. Confining these peasants to such strategic hamlets also creates new forms of insecurity. The situation becomes more complicated when the war and other causes of insecurity come from another country. In all these situations, the peasants' economic and food security are undermined. They are placed in conditions of dependency where they have to wait for alms, handouts and rations. In such a situation of externalised war and insecurity over which the domestic state claims to have no direct bearing, all the affected individuals have to search for individual solutions to this socio-political-militaristic problem. It is this kind of scenario that the peasants of Kigezi found themselves in. The war and the resultant general insecurity forced the local population to flee helter-skelter.

Rwanda's hostilities into Kigezi resulted in displacements, human suffering and family dispersal. By mid November 1990, hundreds of terror-stricken residents of Karujanga had protested to the Rwandan Border Monitoring Team against these hostilities. Their grievances included loss of human lives, destruction of property, halting of agricultural activities and education for the children. Business and trade closed as markets and trading centres were abandoned.¹¹ These attacks generated insecurity that made it impossible for the peasants to go back to work in their gardens or to harvest food there.

The growing crops were choked by weeds and those ready for harvest were either harvested by the Rwandan soldiers and Rwandan armed civilians or they got destroyed in the fields because of non-harvest. Even in situations that seemed free of Rwandan forces, the fear of insecurity remained high. This fear stemmed from the landmines that the Rwandan forces were planting in the peasants' gardens. Other sources of insecurity included ambushes, abductions and cruel deaths to whoever sneaked back to the gardens and homes. The same applied to the Rwandan refugees who had fled into Uganda. Those who tried to return home lost their lives. The problem was compounded by the fact that the border areas were not guarded by the UPDF. This kept people in permanent fear of being shelled, blown up by mines and explosives or abducted to Rwanda to face agonising deaths. Through these mechanisms, the Rwandan war and the insecurity continued to inflict heavy losses on Kigezi. These created favourable conditions for a disastrous famine.¹²

The start and spread of this war and the resultant insecurity created conducive conditions for a primitive accumulation of wealth. This was mainly through thefts and looting of property. In fleeing this war and insecurity, the inhabitants left behind their property. This exposed that property for the marauding Rwandan forces and armed civilians to loot and destroy. Thus, within two months after the start of the war, over 200 head of cattle had been stolen from the Kamwezi area by unidentified armed men in army uniform.¹³ These areas were also faced with a refugee problem. The Rwandan refugees were crossing into Uganda with large herds of cattle. This created new problems of space, pasturage, food and security for both the people and their livestock. Livestock movement from one geographical zone to another with different veterinary regimes also posed a threat in terms of disease transmission.

The district administration took some steps to check these Rwandan activities in Uganda. As it did not have a standing army at its command and lacked resources to recruit one, it embarked on mobilising and training the local population for self-defence. It

trained Local Defence Units (LDUs) and the state equipped them with weapons.¹⁴

The training of LDUs was very timely as in February 1991, the RPF was reported to have extended its operations along the whole Uganda-Rwanda border. This implied widespread insecurity as this military expansion transformed the whole border area into a battle zone.¹⁵ The Rwandan forces responded by stepping up their military incursions into Uganda. The subsequent events demonstrate this very clearly. The Rwandan forces shelled Kisoro and killed five people on 11th February.¹⁶ A few days later, the Rwandan forces carried out heavy bombardment of Kisoro on the Congo border. The scared peasants demanded for state protection.¹⁷ By then, there were reports in Kisoro of local support for the RPF. Some local peasants and businessmen sympathetic to the RPF were said to be mobilising food and money to support the RPF's cause.¹⁸ This in itself could constitute grounds for attack by the Rwandan forces on Uganda. But the subsequent horrendous atrocities that were committed by the Rwandan forces in Rwanda came to demonstrate that the real causes of these hostilities and atrocities had to be sought in the politics and ideology of the Kigali regime.

The suffering peasants articulated their plight, suffering, grievances and losses to the border monitoring teams. They specifically confronted the Rwandan delegations and monitoring team demanding for an end to these attacks and compensation for the victims of the war.¹⁹ Nor was the Uganda government spared. They challenged it for its insensitivity to their suffering and demanded protection. Still, the border area remained a no-go zone, instilling greater fear and despair among the peasants.²⁰

Another obnoxious development from this war was the countrywide hunt for Ugandans in Rwanda. These included wage workers, *magendoists*²¹ and those who had gone to visit relatives and friends. This wage labour migration from Kigezi to Rwanda can be traced to the decline and the subsequent collapse of the Ugandan economy during Amin's dictatorship in the 1970s. That occurred just when the Rwandan economy was booming and the

Rwandan franc was appreciating. This created an outlet for crops, manufactured goods and labour from Uganda. People moved from Kigezi to work for wages in Rwanda on casual, contract and permanent terms. The people involved in these transactions did not require travel documents to cross the border. Here, it needs to be recalled that historically, the peoples along these borders shared ethnic belonging, totems, customs, cultures and social practices. The Anglo-German-Belgian border demarcation of 1911 marked the official severing of these ties. When this war broke out, the Kigali regime began to propagate politics of hatred against Ugandans. All Ugandans were deemed *inyangarwanda*. The Rwandan forces, administration, cadres of the MRND and the local population mounted hunts for Ugandans in Rwanda. Those who did not have *laissez passer*.²² Even those who had procured them lost them as they were confiscated and torn by their captors. They were then subjected to the gruesome, agonising ordeals. Those who managed to escape this human hunt returned home empty-handed.²³ We cannot rule out the possibility of RPF operatives having infiltrated Rwanda under the cover of these activities.

The Impact of the War on Kigezi Within the First Two Years

The RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda severed relations between Uganda and Rwanda. Consequently, all the transactions at regional and individual levels ceased. Kigezi became one of the major victims of these developments as its economy was deeply integrated with the Rwandan economy through *magendo* (smuggling), legitimate trade and wage labour migration. The war and the insecurity that it engendered caused an economic crisis in Kigezi. Internally, the attacks, hostilities, abductions and killings stopped agricultural activities. Yet these border areas were the most fertile areas and the major agricultural resource bases for the district. The disrupted internal trade and led to the closure of businesses in Kigezi.²⁴ All the border towns, trading centres and other connecting points with Rwanda were deserted.

Rather than taking a statist position of condemning *magendo* or an anachronistic one that would glorify it, there is need to understand it on its own terms. The *magendo* economy arose out of the economic and political crises in Uganda during Amin's dictatorship. These included the economic collapse that largely stemmed from Amin's Economic War, his regime's resource extraction policies intended to militarise the economy, state control of prices of peasants' produce, and state-inspired insecurity in the country. Others stemmed from the mismanagement of the export-import economy by the *mafutamingis*,²⁵ plus their active involvement in the creation and perpetuation of the *magendo*. While the *magendo* emerged as a lucrative venture for the *mafutamingi* class, it also became the last resort for the peasants. The question then is how and whether the peasants participated and benefited from it. This will be examined by recapitulating the functionality and specificity of the *magendo* economy.

In the *magendo* economy, the peasants would carry their produce across the border and sell it at high prices. These peasants would then use the proceeds to purchase manufactured goods at low prices and bring them to Uganda. Notable among these were iron sheets and household necessities. In other cases, the *mafutamingi* bought the crops from the peasants and ferried them across the border. The main forms of transportation included head carriers and motorised transport. *Magendo* activities were normally carried out at night, risking bullets of the Ugandan forces and those of the primitive accumulators or robbers (*abambuzi*). The businessmen would hire convoys of carriers (*Abeeguzi*) to carry coffee and other merchandise to the neighbouring countries. These would be under heavily armed escort. *Magendo* helped the peasants to overcome non-payment by marketing boards and co-operative societies which used to issue promissory notes and low prices for produce. Those involved in the *magendo* avoided payment of customs duties, extraction and retention of part of proceeds from export crops for price stabilisation, wages and salaries. There is no doubt, therefore, that the war negatively affected whoever was involved in *magendo*. Many peasants lost their property and merchandise

across the border.²⁶ The war effected all border activities including businesses and hotels, cyclist transporters (*boda boda*) and money changing. The business centres were deserted and the buildings and shops were demolished or ravaged by the war.²⁷ Even legitimate trade and transportation of goods became impossible as the road between the Katuna border and Kigali was mined, allegedly by the RPF.²⁸

The Rwandan forces maintained their incursions into Kigezi. They continued to shell the area, killed some people and abducted others.²⁹ By mid 1992, these hostilities had displaced 63,000 people in Kabale and Kisoro districts. On top of that, 91 people had been killed, 115 people had been injured and 35 people had been abducted. A total of 863 houses had been destroyed and 6,627 students had abandoned school. The government had lost a lot of revenue from school fees and taxes from the displaced population. There was persistent looting of food, livestock and household property, removal of iron sheets from the roofs of houses, and burning of houses along the border. By mid August 1993, more than 3,000 cattle had been looted from the border. Grazing had to be done under UPDF protection.³¹ Similarly, the UPDF had to be deployed in Kisoro District to escort some peasants to their gardens to collect food.³²

Given the agrarian crisis and land problems, it even became difficult for the displaced people to put up temporary accommodation structures and to carry out emergency agriculture for immediate necessities. Worse still, there was no government infrastructure for such emergency. There were no food and financial schemes in place to cater for the people. Consequently, many of them sought shelter among the families in the area. Through this internal arrangement, some households gave refuge to as many as sixteen displaced people. Through this process, the displaced people transferred their social and economic burdens to the host households. Others took shelter in religious institutions, public buildings and administration centres. The refugee camps were crowded with the displaced people. In Kisoro, over 4,000 displaced people were put in

camps. The reality was that an external war had transformed them into refugees in their own country. They had no wherewithal to subsidise their upkeep, had no source of means of livelihood, and lacked savings or food reserves to sustain them. The situation soon worsened as more refugees came in from the Congo.³³

The impact of the war on Rubaya Gombolola in Kabale District gives an insight into how the war affected the peasants. In that gombolola, the war displaced over 23,000 people. By September 1992, 33 people had been killed and 46 injured. Many people had been abducted and 301 head of cattle had been lost. The Rwandan troops crossed into Rubaya frequently to loot property. They would then set the houses on fire on a massive scale. All this was a great loss for one gombolola as compared to the whole Kabale District even in the four years. In Kabale District as a whole, 86 people had been killed, 125 injured, 839 cattle had been lost and 1,450 houses had been destroyed.³⁴ These casualties did not include people who died from other diseases arising from the harsh conditions of displacement. The Kabale District Administration reported that 60 percent of the population in the six gombololas along the border were affected by the war. The cost of settling them was estimated at Shs. 136 million.³⁵ By the end of the war, it was estimated that Kabale District had lost US \$ 10 million worth of resources.³⁶ This included a total revenue of Shs. 6.2 billion from uncollected taxes and school fees. The war stalled different public projects, notable among which was electricity and water. The war did not spare capitalist farmers and rich peasants in the district either. The dairy farms became easy targets for the marauding Rwandan troops and armed civilians. They looted 150 head of cattle from one dairy farm in Kabale District on August 17, 1991. Another farm lost twenty-five head of cattle through the same way.³⁸ In Kisoro District, the Rwandan forces looted eighteen head of cattle on March 3 and 14, 1992. They raided again four days later, killed two cows and two sheep.³⁹

It would be erroneous to assume that the displaced peasants did not struggle for their rights in this war

situation. When the NRM government continued being indifferent to their plight, the people of Kabale threatened to hold a protest march in Kabale Municipality so as to draw its attention. It then upon deployed troops along the border. It promised to reimburse the district's budget deficit, pay school fees for the affected children, rehabilitate the schools and houses damaged by the war. It also sent in some food relief for the displaced people. The problem had become broader. The war had created rampant famine and poverty all over the region. Worse still, many displaced people did not receive any government assistance at all. They hunted for food and those that failed to get it went hungry while others cooked wild plants. Many displaced people did odd and degrading jobs for food. The District Administration did not have solutions to offer them. The then Kabale District Administration (DA) advised the displaced population to look for employment and avoid idleness. He promised them jobs in the industries that government was planning to set up in the district.⁴¹ This was a blatant lie as these starving people could not look for jobs in non-existent industries. Such an utopian solution reflected lack of concern and commitment to people's plight. Its object was to save the government's face and hide its inability to assist the people. It needs to be noted here that despite the promise, there is no single industry that government has proposed for Kigezi, nine years later. The irony is that government is currently selling all its industries, factories and parastatals in its divestiture programme to fulfil the IMF's conditionalities. The issue of setting up new industries could not arise

Faced with internal popular pressures over insecurity, cumulative suffering and loss of property, the presidents of Uganda and Rwanda met in Arusha, Tanzania, over the matter. President Museveni's entourage included two bishops hailing from Kisoro — the Catholic Bishop of Kabale Diocese and the Church of Uganda Bishop Muhabura Diocese in Kisoro. Following the then dominant statist ethnicising approach in Rwanda, the choice of these escorts was deliberate: one bishop belonged to the Batutsi social grouping while the other one belonged to the Bahutu social grouping.

It needs to be pointed out here that the author of this article does not subscribe to that myopic ethnicist approach. The presence of these two bishops was very important. Historically, the population of Kisoro shares lineages and totems with the people of Rwanda. They have similarities in language and cultural practices. From colonial records, Nyindo, the chief of Bufumbira at the advent of colonialism, was cousin to King Musinga of Rwanda. Nyindo was reported to have been paying tribute to King Musinga before the British colonisation of Kigezi.⁴² Another point worth considering is the historical rivalry between these two religions in Uganda. It would seem that Museveni's intention in taking the two bishops (a Muhutu and a Mututsi and a Protestant and a Catholic) was to impress it on Habyarimana to reach an understanding with the RPF and resolve their conflict internally. Habyarimana seems to have failed to grasp it. Another point is that Museveni wanted to allow the two Bishops to air the suffering of the people in their own languages in Habyarimana's language. This would at the same time exonerate government and instil more confidence in the people of Kigezi that the government was searching for solutions with the direct involvement of their religious leaders.

Museveni is reported to have told Habyarimana of the tremendous domestic pressures that he was meeting to respond to Rwanda's hostilities. Habyarimana's response was that Rwanda was shelling the RPF bases. Rwanda accused Uganda of aiding the RPF materially, territorially and militarily. Uganda continued to deny these allegations as calculated diversionary lies aimed at drawing Uganda into Rwanda's internal conflicts. Just as that month was ending, Radio Rwanda announced that the Rwandan forces had pushed the RPF into Uganda. Whether true or false, this announcement was meant to tell the world that the RPF was operating from Uganda. It served to explain and justify the past, the on-going and future incursions into Uganda. Internally, it was also aimed at boosting the morale of the Rwandan forces.

The Efficacy of the Weapon of Terror

The Kigali regime had responded militarily to the RPF military invasion. At the same time, it applied the weapon of terror and fear of instant death on those that were supporting the RPF. Its multi-barrelled weapon of fear through loud noise-making, death by shooting, shelling and bombing, ambushes and abductions, was very successful in creating permanent fear among the population. We shall demonstrate this with examples. Rwanda's shelling of Kigezi was so fatal that even the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs was forced to visit some of its casualties during his border inspection tour. The renewed intensive shelling of Kigezi forced him to cut short his search for the RPF bases.⁴³ Within the same period, bombs killed one peasant and fatally injured another in Kavu.⁴⁴ The Kabale DA was forced to address a public rally at Kabale Stadium over the crisis. In his address, he attributed these attacks to some quislings from Kigezi that were sneaking into Rwanda to sell wrong information to the Rwanda government that the RPF was operating from Uganda. He warned the culprits to stop it since such false information would continue to cause problems to the area.⁴⁵

Ambushes, abductions, and murders constituted a chilling and dreadful psychological weapon of insecurity. This will be demonstrated with a few examples from 1992. In one instance in Kabale District, a primary school headmaster was abducted from his garden in broad daylight while he and his wife were harvesting peas. He was taken to Rwanda and killed. The Rwanda government refused to hand over his body to the Uganda government despite the latter's persistent request for it. Rwanda instead intensified its attacks on Kigezi.⁴⁶ Another horrendous abduction occurred on January 23, 1992. In this case, the Rwandan forces kidnapped a man from Uganda. They killed him and dumped his body in a swamp at the Uganda-Rwanda border.⁴⁷ Within the same period, ten marauding Rwandan troops crossed into Kamuganguzi. They shot dead one rich peasant and looted his fifteen cows. These Rwandan troops then shelled the whole

area throughout the night from their strategic position of Omukaniga. This night shelling created great fear among the population and it also caused extensive damage to property. Within the same period, the Rwandan troops abducted a businessman from his garden of beans. This occurred on February 12, 1992. He was taken to Rwanda and killed.⁴⁸ This form of terror that was being perpetrated surreptitiously instilled permanent fear in the population.

Kisoro suffered a similar fate. In one instance, the Rwandan troops crossed into Kisoro on January 13, 1992 and shot dead a twenty-year-old girl. They roughed up one man and tortured him before shooting him in the legs. They then abducted another twenty-year-old girl. These events occurred a day after a landmine had fatally injured four peasants that were harvesting food in their garden. Within the same time, shelling killed a youth on January 14, 1992.⁴⁹ Within that week, a landmine exploded in a garden and killed a woman. It injured two others and the Rwandan troops abducted another one. Within the same week, shells killed one man and injured seven people.⁵⁰ In another incident, the Rwandan troops abducted a woman and her baby from her garden where she had gone to collect food.⁵¹ The population along the border corridor was forced to move to Kisoro town for security. Some of those who sneaked to their homes to collect food ended up being killed by the Rwandan troops or the planted bombs.

It would be self-limiting to reduce the incessant incursions into Kigezi to mere food drives as some local people tended to argue. This, however, does not exclude certain instances when the Rwandan soldiers entered the abandoned areas at night to loot food and property. One such case occurred in Kisoro in January 1992.⁵² The intensity, persistence and malignancy of these hostilities reflected more profound and deep-rooted causes. These forces cut off all road communication in Kigezi along the border by shooting at any moving object.⁵³ In some instances, their objectives seemed to have been guided by vengeance and material greed through looting rather than by politico-military motives.

There were many instances where the Rwandan troops would shell Uganda with the motive of crossing into Uganda to loot. Shelling would be aimed at scaring away the peasants. One discourse in support of looting holds that looting and scorched earth policy are essential mechanisms for denying the enemy resources to make war. Looting is also seen as critical in replenishing the material resources of the looting force.⁵⁴ Such views run counter to reality. If such views were to hold true, the looting property would be pooled together into the national treasury. Secondly, countries would be having looting squads the way the invading British colonialists did in their offensives against the indigenous population.⁵⁵

Looting is indiscipline. It reflects giving prominence to personal interests over the country's interests. First, the politics and practices of looting disorient the troops' attention from the war. Secondly, the rush for the loot demobilises the troops and undermines discipline and shifts their loyalty from property. It curtails their mobility and exposes the concealment. The booty may cause infighting among the troops and their commanders. Thirdly, the cost of a shell fired into Kigezi were not comparable to the old iron-sheets, household utensils or livestock that the troops would be targeting to loot. Nor were they sure that they would ever leave the war zone alive with their booty. We shall illustrate a few cases of the looting phenomenon in Kigezi in 1992.

In February 1992, the Rwandan troops shelled Katuna and forced the peasants to flee. They then crossed the border, climbed the buildings and began to remove iron sheets. The UPDF came and chased them away. They were forced to abandon some of the iron sheets that they had taken. A similar pattern was followed in Rubaya. The Rwandan troops fired bombs in areas where people had taken refuge. They killed two people and injured others. They continued shelling and killed a man and his baby. His wife sustained fatal injuries. Having prepared the ground for their soft landing, they crossed into Rubaya on February 22, 1992 and removed the roof of a primary school. They were chased away by the UPDF.⁵⁶ Eighty Rwandan troops crossed into Kisoro on March 3, 1992 to loot property. They were,

however, repulsed by the UPDF and they retaliated by shelling Uganda.⁵⁷ The deployment of the UPDF and the vigilance of the LDUs gradually checked this looting and the incursions. This confined the Rwandan forces to shelling and shooting into Uganda from across the border. By April 1992, they mounted incessant shelling in Kamwezi. The shelling injured one boy and displaced over 1,500 peasants. They, however, failed to cross the border.⁵⁸ They shelled again on May 1-2, 1992, killed one person and caused a series of fatal casualties.⁵⁸ In Kabale District, the UPDF repulsed them when they attempted to cross and loot cattle in August 1993.⁶⁰

One of the lessons that Uganda learnt from the 1978/79 war with Tanzania was that no country could invade another country to resolve the internal problems of the invaded country. When Uganda got confronted with this new conflictual situation, it avoided any action that would draw it into direct military involvement with Rwanda. The NRM leadership was well aware that the Rwandan hostilities against Uganda were secondary contradictions. There were signs of anger and frustration from the military attacks and defeats on the battlefield in Rwanda. These contradictions would be resolved through the on-going contestation for political power within Rwanda itself. This was because the locus of power being contested for was in Rwanda.

May 1992 marked the decisive shift of forces in favour of the RPF. Some security returned to Kigezi as soon as the war shifted from the border area and headed towards Kigali. The displaced people began to return to their homes. Some areas remained insecure. There were still some attacks. In one incident, the Rwandan forces shelled Kisoro market on July 29, 1992 and forced hundreds of people to flee the marketplace. This shelling injured two people and destroyed property.⁶¹ The object of shelling amidst such a crowded market was to inflict heavy casualties on the civilians and spread terror.

Many displaced people could not return to their areas because of insecurity. Yet, government failed to supply them with food rations on the excuse that it lacked money. The Kabale Administration ac-

cused the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of failing to send money or rations for 7,000 displaced people. It accused government of making empty promises of relief food for the past four months although it was well aware of the district administration's incapacity to feed them.⁶² Another prevailing form of insecurity was from landmines and explosives that were planted by the Rwandan forces. The situation was so grave that the DA Kisoro warned the displaced peasants not to rush to their gardens as there could be dangerous explosives planted by the Rwandan forces. He confirmed this by citing a fresh incident in which nine peasants had lost their limbs due to those explosives.⁶³

The conclusion of the war in 1994 did not solve the internal displacement problem in Kigezi. Many people remained stranded in the places of refuge. Their homes had been destroyed and their property looted. Yet, they were not receiving assistance from government. In Kabale District, the Shs. 50 million that the DA had promised did not reach them. Even the 300 bags of maize flour and beans that the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare sent to Kabale District were taken to the gombolola of the then LC V Chairman. Thus, the other displaced people did not receive anything.⁶⁴

The peasants in Kigezi put forward their case demanding redress from the government and from the international community. They argued that they had fallen victim to a foreign war in which they had lost their people and property. They asked the government to fulfil the president's promise of compensating those who had lost their relatives and property in the war.⁶⁵ Then the district administration shied away from all matters concerning these people's plight and compensation. The explanation for this changed attitude gradually came out through the press that the district had received Shs. 100 million to compensate these people but had diverted the money to other projects. This was later confirmed by the auditor's reports. The diverting of money from the purpose it is intended for is one mechanism that facilitates corruption at the district level.⁶⁶

From Internal Displacement Crisis to Refugee Crisis

By February 1993, the military situation in Rwanda had changed, with the RPF having taken a decisive upper hand. While this was resolving the insecurity and displacement crisis in Kigezi, people fleeing the fighting in Rwanda came to Kigezi. This was a new dimension in the agrarian crisis. Thus, a small district like Kisoro received 10,000 refugees in one day. These were mainly women and children.⁶⁷ They were soon followed by a group of 5,000 fleeing children.⁶⁸ It had no solution other than camping them at the airstrip.⁶⁹ Putting all these refugees in camps posed new problems of insecurity, congestion, hygiene, resources and environment. In fact, there was an eruption of diseases like dysentery and scabies.⁷⁰ Other problems from this refugee crisis included depletion of resources for fuel and over-stress on the environment. But ultimately, the actual solution to these problems would have to come from the on-going military struggles within Rwanda itself. This began to take shape in August, when the refugees began to leave Uganda for the RPF-controlled areas. But just then, a new wave of refugees came in from Congo.⁷¹ By October 1993, Kigezi was already accommodating over 11,000 Rwandan refugees.⁷² All these reveal ways through which Kigezi got entangled in consecutive crises right from the RPF invasion of Rwanda. In fact, the new developments that followed the regicide of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi on April 6, 1994 revealed that the external conditions for breeding insecurity in Kigezi were still rife. As soon as the genocide began, thousands of refugees fled to Kigezi.⁷³ This again put on Kigezi the heavy burden of feeding and accommodating them. Then four days later, the Rwandan forces stationed at the border shelled Kamwezi the whole day. This created terror and destruction of property.⁷⁴ At the same time, refugees from Rwanda continued to cross the border to Kigezi.⁷⁵ By mid August that year, South-western Uganda was accommodating more than 45,000 refugees from Rwanda and the Congo.⁷⁶ All these events in Kigezi show how war and insecurity unfold negatively and destructively, threatening human beings and all their achievements. They underline how security and peace - the twin oppo-

sites of insecurity and war - are a condition *sine non* to stability and human development. To understand the solution to war and insecurity requires going beyond an examination of their victims to grasp their material, socio-economic and political causes. It is only then that one is able to discern their actual beneficiaries. The issue of security in Kigezi was contingent upon the contesting forces in Rwanda. After the war had broken out, it became incumbent upon the Kigali leadership and the other political forces in Rwanda to control the internal situation and resolve its contradictions with the RPF. In the event of its failure, the other option rested with the RPF to wrest state power from the Kigali regime and create conditions for peace and security. The point here is not to give prominence to militarism but take cognisance of the concrete situation. These were the armed parties in conflict. Of course, long-lasting peace and security had to involve the local population. These had a great stake in the peace process. However, peace and security could only be a product of all the Rwandan - the Kigali regime, the opposition groups, the population, the RPF and other Rwandans in diaspora. This was an opportunity that could be secured only through the initiatives and active involvement of the Kigali regime. If that opportunity were lost, then peace and security in Rwanda would remain elusive. The fallacy of any one party trying to guarantee security and social justice for the other sections of society came to the fore right from the inception of the war. Out of fear, hate and vengeance, the dominant section of the Rwandan society wreaked havoc on the minority Batutsi. This ended in the 1994 genocide. Neither could the RPF prevent it in spite of its superiority in discipline, unity of purpose, firepower, military skill and subtlety. After wresting power from the Kigali regime, the RPF failed to disarm and arrest the defeated Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe (the militia of the MRND government in Rwanda. This militia was largely responsible for perpetration for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda). Letting them go out of the country with all the weaponry meant that the agencies of terror were being let loose and this became a new source of insecurity.

The new threat to Kigezi involved the breakout of cholera and dysentery in the refugee camps at Goma. The government, the LCs, the media and the population mounted a campaign of hygiene to prevent this danger. The other measures included checks on mobility and quarantines. Just as this threat was waning, the defeated Rwandan forces began to come to Kigezi to trade in arms.⁷⁷ This had a wide range of possibilities of insecurity, ranging from armed robberies and homicides to banditry and insurgency. These forces were also carrying out reconnaissance and preparing ground for attacks on Rwanda and Uganda. It did not take long before they attacked the RPF positions in Rwanda and killed some returnees. Within the same period, about 120 of them launched an attack on Kisoro town and forced the residents to flee. They held the area for some hours until when they repulsed by a strong military force.⁷⁸ Gradually, insecurity increased in Kigezi as these forces stepped up attacks from the Congo. In one of the attacks, the RPF chased these forces from Rwanda and they fled to Kabale District in July 1997. These Interahamwe then killed one civilian in the area and the LDUs began to hunt for them.⁸⁰ By the end of 1998, 3000 Rwandan refugees from Congo were reported to have fought Kisoro officials.⁸¹ At the beginning of March 1999, they crossed again into Kisoro and Kabale Districts. They killed forest guards and hacked to death with machetes eight tourists. They stole their money and looted cattle from the villages.⁸² All these demonstrate that these defeated Rwandan forces and Interahamwe have remained a real security threat to Kigezi.

The Cost of the War on the Peasantry

The displaced peasants in Kigezi could not access land to produce food owing to the prevailing agrarian crisis. This created a condition of permanent food crisis. This was compounded by lack of employment opportunities in Kigezi. In a predominantly peasant economy like Kigezi, agriculture is the main occupation, source of food and incomes. The war removed the peasants from the conditions of self-sustenance and self-respect and it placed

them in harsh, humiliating conditions of impoverishment and begging. The food reserves within the households of refugees were depleted without replenishment. Their situation gradually became more frustrating when the promised handouts were not sent to them. This meant permanence of starvation. By August 1992, the situation was pathetic. The Kabale LC V Secretary appealed to government to provide urgent aid to the displaced people. This famine created misunderstandings and enmity amongst the displaced population and even with those households that were offering them assistance. It also created misunderstandings and conflict between them and the LC officials over empty promises of rations.⁸³ It had created conditions for the raging famine by preventing agricultural activities for two consecutive years. The absurdity that the DA pointed out was that the affected border areas were the most fertile and they were the ones that generated the highest revenue. This situation had been compounded by the lack of rains. The positive aspect was that the displacements had the unintended result of circumstantial land rest and rejuvenation for over two years. The land grew into bushes, which regenerated the soil and the environment.

Constant fleeing resulted in suffering, psychological violence and fragmentation of families. Human morals degenerated. This was evidenced through lying, false promises, looting, thefts, promiscuity and prostitution. On November 5, 1993, the press reported that housewives were being used as sex objects by the United Nations (UN) Peace-keepers at the Rwanda border. These troops were luring married women with a hundred dollars. These women would then be forced to serve five or six men. They would then be paid five or ten dollars and then be thrown out.⁸⁴ These harsh conditions made people vulnerable to diseases. The conditions included congestion in the areas of refuge, and lack of food, shelter and clothing. There were outbreaks of fever and dysentery. There were no medical or veterinary services. The medical centres had been destroyed or looted of drugs, and the medical personnel had abandoned them. There were no ambulance facilities to transport the sick and the

war casualties. Worse still, the roads along the border were impassable.

There were various responses to this insecurity. While the majority of the peasants sought safety in safer areas and later returned after the war, others migrated to other districts and others lost hope. Some people went to join the fighting forces. It is probable that many of them could have been inspired by material and monetary considerations. Some of them were recruited to carry out reconnaissance activities. The RPF is reported to have recruited many of them for different purposes. These included fighting, transportation of weaponry and other logistics, food production and food preparation. This enabled those who were recruited in these war circumstances to gain knowledge and experience of war and access some material benefits.

The instantaneous disappearance of *magendo* exposed the dangers of heavy dependence on external markets. It was in recognition of this that the district administration was compelled to search for alternatives to *magendo*. The Kabale DA reported that they had found the solution in reorienting the peasant agriculture to commercial wheat production. The District Administration had already concluded a deal with the Grain Milling Company at Jinja in which Kabale would supply 10,000 tonnes of wheat to the company. The Administration was optimistic about it. It considered the land to be very fertile and amenable to wheat and barley production. It was also banking on the peasants whom it described as very industrious and committed to work in spite of limited resources such as land, bank loans and industry and little knowledge of proper land use.⁸⁵ What the Administration was denying constituted a critique of the colonial and post-colonial state for failing to set up industries in Kigezi to absorb local labour, manufacture goods for the local demand and create markets for agricultural produce. It brought out a strong case for manufacturing goods locally and for the government's active involvement in addressing the prices of the different commodities. It was also a critique of the failure to have food security policies. It raised the urgency of instituting emergency funds for disasters and war. It exposed

the government's failure to address issues relating to people's welfare, and accountability of public resources. In agriculture, it exposed the danger of imported breeds of cattle. Unlike the local breeds of cattle, the imported breeds were threatened with extinction due to inadequate attention during the war. During the incessant hostilities, the imported breeds could not move long distances due to fear of exposure to ticks and diseases. This resulted in heavy loss of livestock.

This war created favourable conditions for looting of household property, food crops, livestock, building materials and bikes. In Kabale District, Kabale Trading Centre sprang up as a vibrant business centre for the looted iron sheets.⁸⁶ The Kabale DA had to issue stern warnings against this looting and directed the local authorities to arrest and impound anyone found looting. Some of the iron sheets and property were being looted from Rwanda and others were being looted from the abandoned households inside Uganda. Some of the respondents rationalised looting in Rwanda as a means for the people to get themselves back the property that the Rwandans had looted. This justification for looting is flawed. First, any form of looting is unethical and criminal. Secondly, there is a very high probability that those who crossed to loot property in Rwanda were habitual criminals rather than the ones whose property had been looted by the Rwandans. In view of the fact that the looted property became the property of the looters, and also that the looters were not the *bona fide* representatives of those people whose property had been looted, the defence for looting remains unacceptable. It is worth noting here that looting had become a form of occupation for some individuals. They would dispose of the loot at throwaway prices, consume the proceeds and rush back to loot more property. This looting worsened the collapsed relations between the people of Kigezi and Rwanda. The RPF had to step in to force to stop it. It explained that looting undermined the local population's support for the RPF. The only legitimate economic activity that it mentioned was the cross-border trade in food.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this war inflicted heavy costs on the agrarian crisis in Kigezi. These stemmed mainly from the widespread insecurity and deaths. There was heavy loss of material resources through destruction by shelling, looting, abandonment, stoppage of productive activities, commerce and wage labour. A lot of labour-time was lost. As insecurity from military incursions, shelling, abductions, landmines and threats intensified, the peasants had to flee their homes in the border areas for safety. They abandoned their homes and their agrarian property like land, bulky household property, and their different occupations. This resulted in crops growing wild and being choked off by bushes, houses being shelled and/or unroofed, and property being looted. This long-term internal displacement, coupled with lack of social services created new conditions for famines, poverty, diseases and overcrowding. Being short of agrarian property, many of the displaced people transferred their problems to the households where they sought shelter, while others had to stay in public places like churches. To these was added an influx of refugees from Rwanda. All these combined to increase pressure on the land and environment, resulting in the degradation of soil. Added to this was lack of implements of production and other inputs, and absence of employment facilities. Worse still, this was undermined by the *magendo* along the border and it created new forms of social conflicts in Kigezi. Thus, as this article has demonstrated, this war inflicted heavy costs on Kigezi and it worsened the agrarian crisis there.

Endnotes

1. The Rwanda Patriotic Front, also known as *Inkotanyi*.
2. This article is part of my Ph.D. Thesis, presented at Jadavpur University, 1999.
3. This omission is evidenced in Gerard Prunier's 1995 work entitled: *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 1959-1994*. London: Hurst & Co. The same is evident in Mahmood Mamdani's latest published book on Rwanda (2001) entitled: *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. While warning against a methodological weakness of turning political boundaries into epistemological boundaries, Mamdani realized that though the genocide had taken place within the geographical confines of Rwanda, it did not mean that either the dynamics that led to it or the dynamics it unleashed in turn were confined to Rwanda. (2001:xiii) Having made this crucial recognition, his work fails to examine the impact of this war on Kigezi, its birthplace.
4. The local population and the press later accused Habyarimana's relatives of being quislings.
5. See Murindwa Rutanga (1997) "Have You Killed Your Tutsi Today.... The Graves Are Half Empty?: An Analysis of Rwanda's Horrendous Holocaust 1990-94". *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 3, 1997. Calcutta: Jadavpur University.
6. This was because the core of the NRA - the main fighting forces and commanders, including President Museveni - come from Nkore while another section comprised the Rwandan exiles.
7. *The Star Newspaper*, January 21, 1991.
8. This was a political concept developed by the ruling class in Rwanda to refer to all those who were opposed to the Kigali regime. This was a deliberate construction aimed at mobilizing the masses against the RPF and all those considered as their natural allies, mainly the Batutsi, all those who had been critical of the Habyarimana regime and whoever was assisting the RPF in whatever form.
9. *The Citizen Newspaper*, October 30, 1990 reported that more than 100 students had deserted four secondary schools in Kabale and joined the RPF.
10. Marx, Karl (1954) *Capital*. Vol. I, New York: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 703.
11. *The New Vision*, November 17, 1990; November 19, 1990.
12. *The New Vision*, November 19, 1990.
13. *The New Vision*, December 12, 1990.
14. Ibid.
15. *The New Vision*, February 2, 1991.
16. *The New Vision*, February 13, 1991. Within the same week, seventy Rwandan refugees crossed into Kisoro.
17. *The Financial Times*, February 21, 1991.
18. *The Star Newspaper*, January 21, 1991.
19. *The New Vision* of February 22, 1991 gives an example in which the peasants in one Kisoro village on 11th of February demanded for compensation from Rwanda for their relatives. Five relatives had been killed and six injured.
20. *The Citizen*, April 17, 1991.
21. The concept *magendoists* refers to people who engage in *magendo*. The concept *magendo* was developed in the 1970s to refer to the cross border illicit trade or smuggling.
22. These are travel documents given by the authorities to allow one to move across borders to other countries.
23. *The New Vision*, April 2, 1991.
24. *The New Vision*, February 17, 1992.
25. The concept *mafutamingi* was developed when the Amin regime declared its economic war to refer to the new rich class that was being created through a process of allocating them property and businesses that the state had appropriated from the expelled Asians.
26. *The New Vision*, February 17, 1992.
27. *The New Vision*, September 22, 1992.
28. *The New Vision*, April 18, 1991.
29. Ibid. The Rwandan forces had shot and killed two peasant women in Bufundi the previous week.
30. *The New Vision*, February 17, 1992. Also see the other papers and district administration reports.
31. *The New Vision*, August 15, 1993.
32. See *The New Vision*, April 8, 1992.
33. *The New Vision*, January 9, 1992; January 13, 1992.
34. Newspapers and Report by Kabale District Administration.
35. *The New Vision*, September 28, 1992.
36. The Kabale District Administration in *The Monitor* of January 22, 1993, and *The New Vision* of January 1993. The District Administration was soliciting for Shs. 8 billion from the European Community for resettling the displaced population. This involved reconstructing 10,000 homes, compensating the relatives of those killed and those whose household property had been looted or destroyed. Others included the feeding and planting requirements of those to be resettled; compensating 839 animals and reconstructing schools and churches.
37. Water shortage is a very critical agricultural problem in Kisoro and in the mountain areas of Kabale District.
38. *The New Vision*, September 22, 1992. The cattle were of the imported breeds and hybrid.
39. *The New Vision*, April 14, 1992.
40. It was reported to be insufficient for the displaced peoples. The fortunate ones received kgs. of maize flour and 2 kgs. of beans per month on average.
41. *The Monitor*, January 22, 1993; *The New Vision*, January 1993.
42. File: "2489: Kigezi: Nindo And His Sub-Chief Paying Tribute to Msinga, Sultan of Ruanda".
43. *The New Vision*, January 29, 1992.
44. *The New Vision*, January 30, 1992.
45. Ibid. The situation was complex as so many individuals from Kigezi had relatives in the Rwanda leadership, including President Habyarimana. Some of them had been benefited materially from these relatives. As such, they would do everything to inform these relatives of whatever they suspected to be aimed at undermining Rwanda's security. This confirms the proverbial statement of blood being thicker than water.
46. *The New Vision*, January 31, 1991.
47. *The New Vision*, February 4, 1992.
48. *The New Vision*, September 22, 1992.
49. *The New Vision* of mid January, 1992.
50. *The New Vision*, January 23, 1992.
51. *The New Vision*, May 15, 1992.
52. *The New Vision*, January 27, 1992.
53. Ibid.
54. Views of the respondents.
55. For examples of this primitive form of accumulation by the British colonialists in Kigezi, see Report by Turpin, ASP and another by the ADC, Kigezi, dated July 5, 1915 on the Kyogoro Counter Offensive. They were reporting that they had looted 180 head of cattle, 650 stock and 500 loads of millet grain from the peasants in Kyogoro.
56. *The New Vision* of February, 1992.
57. *The New Vision*, March 19, 1992.
58. *The New Vision*, April 25, 1992.
59. *The New Vision*, May 15, 1992.
60. *The New Vision*, August 15, 1993.

61. *The New Vision*, July 3, 1992.
62. *The New Vision*, August 29, 1992.
63. *The New Vision*, August 20, 1992.
64. *The New Vision*, June 19, 1995.
65. *The New Vision*, October 4, 1995. President Museveni had made this promise during his tour of Kisoro. The Chairman, LCIII Kamwezi was among those who wrote demanding for the promised compensation. Also see the *New Vision*, April 19, 1996.
66. See Reports of 1995, 1996, District Treasurer's Office, Kabale; and the Auditor General's Report on this money.
67. *The New Vision*, February 17, 1993.
68. *The New Vision*, March 21, 1993.
69. *The New Vision*, June 1, 1993; 10 June 1993.
70. *The New Vision*, August 13, 1993.
71. *ibid.* *The Monitor*, August 17, 1993.
72. *The New Vision* of October 7, 1993; October 11, 1993.
73. *The Daily Topic*, April 11, 1994.
74. *The Monitor*, April 12, 1994.
75. *The New Vision*, April 12, 1994; *The Sunday Vision*, April 17, 1994; and *The New Vision*, May 2, 1994. By 10th May, the number of Rwandan refugees was over 7,500. *The Monitor*, May 10, 1994.
76. *The New Vision*, August 15, 1994.
77. *The New Vision*, June 15, 1995.
78. *The Monitor*, April 24, 1996; *The Crusader*, April 25, 1996.
79. *The New Vision*, June 14, 1996.
80. During this hunt, one Interahamwe, in trying to flee from the LDUs fell in Lake Bunyonyi and drowned. He was buried near the spot where he drowned.
81. *The New Vision*, December 31, 1998.
82. *The Asian Age*, March 4, 1999 and of March 5, 1999.
83. *Op. cit.*
84. *The Monitor*, November 5, 1993.
85. *Op. cit.* This project was embarked on with the Kigezi Cooperative Society emerging as the main actor in the facilitation of wheat production, selling and loaning agricultural inputs and buying the wheat crop.
86. *The Citizen* April 17, 1991; *The New Vision*, January 23, 1992.
87. *The New Vision*, June 16, 1992; June 17, 1992. *The New Vision* editorial of June 17, 1992 appealed to Ugandans to stop looting Rwandans' property. It appealed to the RPF and the Kabale District authorities to stop the looters. The LC V Chairman, Kabale, made a spirited refutation of these press reports on looting - *The New Vision* of June 25, 1992.

CALL FOR ARTICLES FOR MAWAZO

Articles are invited for the forthcoming Mawazo. They should be in word programme and they should not exceed twenty-five pages. They can be sent on diskettes to:

The Editor,
Mawazo
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Makerere University,
P.O. Box 7062, KAMPALA.
Or as attachment files to:
deanfss@ss.mak.ac.ug/ fssdean@infocom.co.ug